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Abstract 
The present study provides with the most recent summary of growth performance 
in transition countries after 25 years since the change of the regime. The empirical 
analysis estimates growth, applying Generalized Least Squares (GLS) estimation 
technique using a panel of 26 transition countries for the period of 25 transition years 
( 1 990-20 1 4) .  Empirical findings of this study confirm that growth performance can be 
explained by the degree of structural reforms, stabilization, and initial conditions along 
with other factors (external growth, regional tensions, government expenditure, and oil 
balance) . Even if initial conditions are important for growth, its influence consistently 
declines. 
The transition is mainly driven by reforms, which are positively correlated with 
favorable initial conditions and high political competition (democracy) . We have found 
that the higher the speed of reforms, the higher is economic growth in transition 
countries. However, the level of democratization plays a vital role in the choice of 
transition path of a country. The study confirmed a positive impact of macroeconomic 
stabilization, investment, and external growth on economic growth in transition countries, 
whereas government expenditure turned out to have an adverse impact on growth. Our 
main results are consistent with the previous studies; however, unlike most other papers, 
this study confirms the significance of investment and government expenditure in the 
growth model .  This study lays the foundation for further research in the area and should 
be of value to local policy-makers . 
Keywords: transition, economic growth, initial conditions, reforms, stabilization. 
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1.1. The Background 
I. Introduction 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, transition countries underwent substantial 
economic, political and social changes. Transition countries took various paths and had 
different speeds of transition. The majority of the transition economies experienced 
significant output decline and hyperinflation in the initial years of the transition . 
However, some of the countries were able to recover much faster than others, and it is 
important to study what are the factors that foster and hinder economic growth of post­
communist countries .  Moreover, the issue of why some countries were able to transition 
relatively quickly, and others are stil l  "stuck in transition" raises the question of what 
determines success and failure of transitions of the post-communist European economies. 
With this in mind, this study aims to find out what explains economic performance in 
transition countries. 
1.2. The Relevance of the Topic 
Despite the fact that more than 25 years has passed since the transition began in 
the post-communist European countries, the process is ongoing. As the transition report 
by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) points out, there are 
sti l l  countries among post-communist countries that are stuck in the transition (20 1 3) .  
While Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) were able to  transition to  a 
market economy relatively successfully, we cannot say the same about the Former Soviet 
Union (FSU) countries (see Appendix A Table l for a list of CEECs and FSU countries). 
The majority of the CEECs were able to demonstrate stable market economy (low 
inflation, debt-to-GDP ratio, lower than 3% budget deficit, and stable exchange rate ) and 
meet the requirements to join the European Union, while many of FSU countries formed 
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The Commonwealth of lndependent States (CIS) - a purely symbolic organization with 
nominal trade-agreements . Distinct contrasts can be observed between countries in the 
CEECs (like the Czech Republic and Poland where GDP per capita (PPP) in 20 1 5  
measured in constant 20 1 1 international dollars was 30,246 and 24,952 respectively) and 
those in the CIS (like Belarus and Turkmenistan where GDP per capita in 20 1 5  was 
1 6,62 1 and 1 5 ,527, respectively) (World Bank, 20 1 7) .  
The drastic divergence between more and less successful transitions makes one 
wonder what makes a transition successful and, therefore, what are the roles played by 
initial conditions, macroeconomic stabilization, and structural reforms on the economic 
performance .  The debate over the impact of the different transition paths on the 
economic growth remains prevalent today. S ince many FSU countries failed to transition 
to market economies and converge with advanced European economies, the subject of 
transition is as relevant today as it has been at the initial stage of the transformation. 
To help transitioning countries achieve and maintain sustainable economic 
growth, we must know what factors affect growth performance and what drives the 
transition. The present study not only empirically examines this question but also departs 
from the mainstream l iterature by accounting for investment and government expenditure 
in our model and for comparing the result of our model run with a panel consisting of 
only transition countries with the one that includes advanced European countries too . To 
the best of our knowledge, this study is the most recent one on this subject, thus 
providing the most current estimation of the economic performance of the post­
communist countries .  The results of this research would be of value to the policymakers 
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of the transitioning countries (particularly, FSU countries), which are striving to improve 
their economic performance and transition to market economies. 
1.3. Research Question and Objectives 
Research Question: what explains growth performance of transition countries? 
Research Goal: The goal of this research is to find out the effects of the most common 
explanatory factors (for transition countries) on growth performance of transition 
economies.  The findings will inform the policymakers about the key elements necessary 
for a sustainable growth and successful transition to market-based economies. 
Objectives: 
1 .  To review relevant l iterature in order to identify critical components of economic 
growth in transition countries .  
2 .  To  conduct an empirical study in  order to find the effects of  the major 
determinants of growth on the economic performance of the post-Soviet countries .  
3 .  To estimate the impact o f  initial conditions and democracy o n  reforms. 
4 .  To suggest interventions and policies that wi l l  aid in improving growth 
performance of the post-communist countries based on the results of the study. 
Organization of the Paper. The paper is constructed in the following chapters . 
Chapter II provides the review of the relevant empirical l iterature and an overview of the 
critical components of growth for transition countries. Chapter III describes data used in 
the analysis and talks about Principal Component Analysis (PCA) used in the estimation 
of initial conditions index. Research methodology and a list of hypotheses are described 
in Chapter IV. Chapter V presents empirical finding of the study, whereas Section VI 
discusses the key findings of the study and draws the conclusion. 
8 
II. Literature Review 
This chapter aims to address the first objective of the study: to review relevant 
l iterature in order to identify critical components of economic performance of transition 
economies .  Here, we determine the key elements of transition and discuss previously 
published empirical studies on this  subject. 
2.1. Critical Components of the Transition 
There is a consensus in the field of comparative economics that there are three 
standard variables that impact the economic performance of the transition countries : 
initial conditions, macroeconomic policy variables, and structural reforms. Other factors 
that influence the transition from planned to a market economy include external growth 
(Falcetti, Lysenko & Sanfey, 2006; Pavletic & Sattler, 2009; Del l '  Anno & Villa, 20 1 3) ,  
oil balance (Falcetti et al . ,  2006; Pavletic & Sattler, 2009),  regional tensions and military 
conflicts (De Melo, Denizer, Gelb, & Tenev, 200 1 ; Fidrmuc, 2003 ; Fidrmuc & Tichit, 
2009; Fischer & Sahay, 2000), democracy, political freedom and civil l iberties (De Melo 
et al, 200 1 ;  Falcetti ,  Raiser, & Sanfey, 2002 ; Pavletic & Sattler, 2009; Fidrmuc & Tichit, 
2009; Hamm, King, & Stuckler, 20 1 2; Dell ' Anno & Villa, 20 1 3 ;  Pi�tek, Szarzec, & Pile, 
20 1 3), foreign and domestic investment (Fidrmuc, 2003; Sharpe & Cannonier, 20 1 6  ), 
government expenditure, and human capital (Fidrmuc, 2003 ; Sharpe & Cannonier, 20 1 6) .  
It is worth mentioning that such factors as  external growth and oil balance might 
help to explain a rapid growth of countries that have not undertaken major reforms. The 
dependent variable in the majority of studies on transition is economic growth, measured 
as the annual percentage change in real GDP (Falcetti et al . ,  2002; Sharpe & Cannonier, 
20 1 6) .  
9 
Initial Conditions. Even though post-communist countries were rather similar in 
the economic and political system and had highly educated population, they had different 
initial conditions at the start of the transition. In particular, there was a significant 
difference in initial conditions between FSU and CEE countries .  For example, FSU 
countries were characterized by relatively less established market-based institutions, a 
longer time spent under the communism (20-30 years more than CEECs), worse 
macroeconomic conditions, more abundant natural resources (e.g. Russia, Kazakhstan, 
Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan), lower per capita incomes, and a less favorable 
geopolitical location (Fischer & Sahay, 2000). Thus, it is reasonable to assume that the 
starting point would play a crucial role in the transition process at least in the short-run. 
Previous empirical studies demonstrate that even if the initial conditions proved to 
be a significant determinant of transition at the start of the transition, their impact 
diminishes over time (De Melo et al . ,  200 1 ;  Falcetti et al . ,  2002; Fischer and Sahay, 
2004; Del l '  Anno & Villa, 20 1 3) .  Moreover, Berg, Borensztein, Sahay and Zettelmeyer, 
( 1 999) argue that a rapid decline in output at the start of the transition can be explained 
largely by the adverse initial conditions. 
Macroeconomic Policy Variables. There is a general agreement in the previously 
published literature that macroeconomic stabilization is a critical element of economic 
growth. The effectiveness of macroeconomic policies is commonly approximated by 
annual inflation rate and fiscal balance (% of GDP). Unsurprisingly, the majority of 
studies find that low inflation and fiscal surplus are positively correlated with faster 
economic recovery and higher economic growth (Falcetti et al . ,  2006). According to 
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Fisher and Sahay (2006), early macroeconomic stabilization together with effective 
structural reforms accelerate growth substantially. 
Structural Reforms. In explaining cross-country differences in economic 
performance during initial years (first four years of transition), initial conditions were 
found to be much more important than macroeconomic policies . However, structural 
reforms are dominant in that respect in the later stages of transition (Heybey & Murrell , 
1 999;  Berg et al . ,  1 999). Furthermore, Berg et al . ( 1 999) argue that structural reforms are 
the major factor determining recovery of the economies followed by macroeconomic 
policies. 
In a recent study Del l '  Anno and Vill ,  (20 1 3) show that the effect of the structural 
reforms on economic performance is significant and robust to many specifications . 
Remarkably, Baltic countries and countries like Poland, having adverse initial conditions, 
were able to transition successfully mainly due to effective structural reforms and 
macroeconomic policies (Fischer & Sahay, 2000) . On the other hand, FSU countries 
stagnated because of slow structural reforms. In other words, fast structural reforms 
following solid macroeconomic policies can help overcome unfavorable initial 
conditions. 
2.2. Empirical Literature 
There are multiple studies conducted in the field that examined growth 
performance of the transition countries. They used different model specifications and 
estimation techniques to study growth and transition of post-communist countries .  
Structural reforms are considered the key driver of transition, and their impact on 
economic performance was investigated thoroughly by Falcetti et al . (2006). The authors 
1 1  
using such techniques as simple Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), two-stage least squares 
(2SLS), 3 SLS,  Arellano-Bond, and Arellano-Baver find out that the effect of reforms on 
growth is significant and robust to nearly every specification of the growth model .  The 
reason behind using 2SLS and 3 SLS is the suspicion for the endogeneity of reforms 
variable, where civil l iberties index is treated as an instrument for reforms. Furthermore, 
the study suggests a significant positive impact of macroeconomic stabilization and 
important, but constantly declining effect of initial conditions on economic growth. 
Based on the research by Pavletic and Sattler (2009), who examine 
macroeconomic performance in post-communist countries using Generalized Method of 
Moments (GMM) technique, institutions (democracy) has a significant effect of on 
economic growth. Moreover, the paper presents an evidence of stimulating effect of 
political competition on liberalization, which in tum have a considerable impact on 
growth. The researchers find a strong positive l ink between economic l iberalization and 
economic growth in transition economies.  
Along with other studies, Fidrmuc ( 2003) tests the relationship between different 
kind of reforms and economic growth using a panel data for 25 transition countries and 5-
year moving averages method, estimating cross-sectional regressions for several periods 
starting from 1 990 until 2000. The study confirms a robust positive effect of reforms on 
growth. Moreover, the author studies the trade-off between democracy and economic 
growth. He concludes that democracy strengthens progress in reforms, which, 
accordingly, enhances growth. In other words, the study shows that democratization has 
a positive impact on growth, though indirectly, through stimulating l iberalization. It 
should be noted that Fidrmuc, unlike other researchers in the field, accounts for 
12 
investment and government expenditure in his econometric model .  However, both of 
these standard determinants of growth variables are found to be statistically insignificant. 
On the other hand, Fidrmuc and Tichit (2009) demonstrate a robust negative 
impact of democracy on growth along with other control variables like a war dummy 
variable and inflation. Besides, this study examines structural breaks and find the 
presence of three breaks and, therefore, four distinct models of economic growth. 
We can notice from the relevant l iterature that the majority of studies have been 
conducted after ten and fifteen years after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The latest 
study on growth in transition countries was carried out by Del l '  Anno and Villa in 20 1 3 ,  
which examined the relationship between the speed o f  reforms and economic growth. 
The study infers that speed of reforms has a robust positive effect on growth and that 
contemporaneous speed of reforms, unlike lagged one, has a negative impact on growth. 
Del l '  Anno and Villa use three-way PCA for estimation of the speed of reforms, whereas 
for model estimation the researchers use The Least Square Dummy Variable 
(LSDV) estimator and GMM technique. Lastly, Sharpe and Cannonier (20 1 6) examine 
the difference in the impact of financial crisis on growth in transition countries and non­
transition countries using difference-in-difference approach. They find that recession 
caused a higher decline in output in transition economies compared to non-transition 
economies.  
The Contribution of the Present Study. Unlike earlier research, the present study 
uses Generalized Least Squares (GLS) technique to estimate growth and reforms 
equations . Empirical analysis reveals a significant and positive effect of the investment 
on growth, we would expect; however, it shows an adverse effect of government 
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expenditure on GDP growth, which contradicts with the findings of Fidrmuc (2003) .  The 
study confirms a significant declining effect of initial conditions, a positive impact of 
macroeconomic stabilization, reforms, and external growth as wel l  as a negative impact 
of regional tensions and financial crisis of 2008 on growth in transition countries .  
In addition, the study il lustrates a strong positive correlation between progress in 
average reforms and average growth as wel l  as a positive link between average 
democracy index and average growth rate (see Chapter VI) . Lastly, this paper has an 
advantage over other research by using more available data, and by providing most up-to­
date analysis of growth performance in the post-communist countries .  The next chapter 
elaborates on the data used for the study. 
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III. Data 
This chapter describes in detail the economic and non-economic variables used in 
our analysis, explores endogeneity and stationarity of time series, and provides the 
rationale and the methodology of PCA, which is used for estimating the initial conditions 
index. Besides, it notes the limitations of the data and concludes with six hypotheses for 
the econometric analysis .  
The present study estimates the impact of the standard growth factors for 
transition economies using two panels :  Panel I (includes only transition countries) and 
Panel II (includes transition and non-transition countries) . The analysis will cover 26 
transition countries 1 and 1 2  advanced European economies over the period of 25 years 
( 1 990-20 1 4) (see Appendix A Table 1 for the l ist of sample countries) . However, 
consistent with Falcetti et al. (2006), the transition time is used instead of a calendar time 
for the analysis with Panel I. Thus several countries are included for a longer time period 
than others (see Appendix A Table 2 for details on transition time). However, for the 
analysis with non-transition countries, calendar time is used, because the advanced 
European countries in the sample did not experience a transition from planned to market 
economy. 
The Western European countries were selected based on similarity with real GDP 
and real GDP per capita with the post-Soviet countries2• Advanced European countries 
were added to the study to increase the number of observations for the estimation and to 
check if the empirical results vary significantly from the findings with Panel I. To 
1 China and Vietnam (included in the study by De Melo et al. (200 1 )  were not included in the present study 
due to their many differences with European transition countries. 
2 Author' s calculations 
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estimate what drives growth, the Generalized Least Squares (GLS) technique is used. 
S ince the data were not always available for all countries over the time span3 , an 
unbalanced panel is used with the highest 580 and 879 observations with Panel I and 
Panel I I  respectively. 
3.1. Key Variables Used 
The study uses economic growth as a dependent variable and several independent 
variables : lagged reforms, time trend, the interaction term of initial conditions and time, 
external growth, investment, fiscal balance, regional tensions dummy, oil balance, 
government expenditure, inflation, a dummy variable for the financial crisis, and 
democracy. Variables definitions and data sources can be found in Appendix A Table 2, 
whereas summary statistics tables and correlation matrixes for both panels can be seen in 
Appendix A Table 3 and Table 4, respectively. However, this study will mainly focus on 
the dataset and estimation of the Panel I, as this way the results can be easier compared to 
the previous research. More details about chosen variables are presented below. 
Growth. Economic growth is a proxy for economic performance, which is 
positively related to transition. It is assumed that when a country transitions from 
planned to market economy, its economic performance will substantially improve. 
Annual real GDP growth (%) is used in this study to measure growth performance, just as 
it is used in the majority of similar studies (Pavletic & Sattler, 2009; Falcetti et al . ,  2006) . 
In our dataset, the mean value for growth is 1 .9 % with a minimum of -52.6 % (Armenia 
in 1 992) and maximum of 3 5 .4 % (Turkmenistan in 1 990) (see Appendix A Table 3) .  
3 Particularly, the data for  initial years of transition for a few former Soviet Republics was missing. 
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Initial Conditions. Initial conditions index is calculated based on the first 
principal component of the PCA using such indicators as GNI per capita in 1 990, pre­
transition growth rate, energy-rich dummy, years spent under central planning, distance 
to EU ( proxied by distance to Brussels), repressed inflation, black market premium, and 
share of agriculture (see Appendix A Table 2) .  It is hypothesized that initial conditions is 
a critical determinant of economic growth at the start of the transition; however, its 
impact diminishes over time. 
Initial conditions index for transition countries ranges from -3 .48 (Czech 
Republic) to 3 .075 (Kyrgyz Republic) with a mean of -0 .0 1 (see Appendix A Table 3b). 
So, the higher negative value for the IC index of a country, the better its initial conditions 
are, and the higher the positive value of the index, the worse are the initial conditions .  
More about calculations of the index for initial conditions using PCA is explained in the 
next section of this chapter. For the dataset with non-transition countries (European 
countries) log of GNI per capita (PPP terms) in 1 990 is used as a proxy for initial 
conditions. 
Time. In the present research, econometric models are estimated in transition 
time. Transition time starts with I and, depending on the time of a break from the 
communist regime, it varies for different groups of transition countries. The rationale 
behind such approach is that transition started at different times in different countries 
because political and economic reforms were implemented at different times.  To 
il lustrate, for central and southeastern European countries (except for Albania) the initial 
year of transition is 1 990, for Albania and Baltic countries, it is 1 99 1  and for the 
Commonwealth of lndependent States (CIS), the initial year of transition is 1 992. 
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Therefore, estimating our economic models in transition time could result in more precise 
estimation. In the present study, time ranges from 1 to 25 (see Appendix A Table 3). It is 
assumed that even if at the initial years of transition output decreased substantially, it 
recovers as transition time proceeds; thus, we expect a positive coefficient for this 
variable. 
Interaction Term between Initial Conditions Index and Time. The interaction 
term between IC index and time is used in studies by Falcetti (2006) and Pavletic and 
Sattler (2009) .  S ince the index for initial conditions is constant over the entire period, we 
are not able to estimate the change of the effect of the initial conditions over time. 
However, the interaction term of IC index with transition time allows us to do so . 
Recall ing that the higher negative value for IC index, the better initial conditions are, the 
positive sign of coefficient for the interaction term between IC index and time indicates 
that the effect of unfavorable initial conditions declines over transition time (Falcetti et 
al . ,  2002). In other words, countries that had weak initial conditions (high positive IC 
Index) at the start of the transition would recover at a slower rate initially but would catch 
up later on. 
Fiscal Balance. The fiscal balance is usually chosen as a proxy for 
macroeconomic stabil ization in comparable studies, and it is preferred over inflation 
because of inflation ' s  extremely high numbers in the initial years of the transition (e .g.  
1 5607 % in Georgia in 1 994) . However, according to Falcetti et al . (2006), the results do 
not change much whether a fiscal balance or inflation is used in the model .  In the current 
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research, both fiscal balance and interaction of inflation and a dummy variable for high 
inflation (inflation above 50%4) are used. 
It is hypothesized that fiscal surplus has a positive impact on growth, while fiscal 
deficit damages economic performance of post-communist countries. Fiscal balance is 
calculated using the data for government revenue and expenses from Government 
Finance Statistic Reports (IMF), and it is expressed as a percentage of GDP. In the 
dataset for the panel ,  representing only transition countries, the mean of fiscal balance is 
-3 .32 % of GDP with the highest value of 20 % of GDP (Azerbaijan in 2008) and the 
lowest of -54 .7 % of GDP (Armenia in 1 993) (see Appendix A Table 3b). In general, a 
vast majority of the transition countries in our dataset had fiscal deficits. 
Reforms. Reforms is a proxy for structural reforms, and it is assumed that 
structural reforms have an immediate negative impact on economic performance (due to 
creative destruction) and positive impact on growth later on. EBRD used to publish 
annual transition indicators that measure progress in market reforms in transition 
economies. They indicate which country from transition countries is more or less 
advanced (Peev & Mueller, 20 1 2) .  
Usually the average of  eight EBRD transition indicators are used to  measure 
reforms in similar studies, which are price liberalization, trade l iberalization, corporate 
governance and enterprise reform, small-scale privatization, large-scale privatization, 
banking reform and interest rate liberalization, competition policy, securities markets and 
other non-bank financial institutions (Falcetti et al . ,  2006; Pavletic & Sattler, 2009). 
4 Author's assumption. So, inflation that is above 50% is considered to be high inflation. 
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However, several authors (Stiglitz, 1 999;  Fisher and Sahay, 2000; De Melo et. al . ,  200 1 )  
showed in their studies that l iberalization and small -scale privatization best explain 
transition, while other EBRD transition indicators fail to add substantial explanatory 
value . For this reason, in the present research reforms is calculated as a simple average 
of three transition indicators : price l iberalization, trade liberalization, and small -scale 
privatization5 • 
It should be noted that in the present study reforms are lagged by one year to 
account for the delay in the impact of the implemented reforms on economic growth. 
Lagged reforms6 are used in several related studies (Falcetti et al . ,  2006; Fidrmuc, 2003 ; 
Staehr, 2003) .  In the current research, lagged reforms range from 1 (no reform) to 4 .33 
(equivalent to the standards of the market economy) with a mean of 3 .42, indicating that 
several transition countries are stil l  stuck in transition (see Appendix A Table 3a (Panel 
I)) . 
External Growth. External growth or demand is a proxy for positive 
development in the key trade partners of a country, which can enhance economic growth 
even in non-reformed economies (Pavletic & Sattler, 2009) . Therefore, it is hypothesized 
that external growth has a favorable impact on growth. In other words, as external 
growth increases, a country is more l ikely to increase its export volume, leading to a 
higher growth rate . External growth is measured as a weighted average of Real GDP 
growth of a country i at year t divided by the sum of weights, where the weights are the 
5 We experimented with a broad definition of reforms (including eight EBRD indicators), however the 
results were stronger when narrower definition of reforms was used. 
6 After experimenting with both contemporaneous and lagged reform, lagged reforms showed stronger 
results. 
20 
share of total exports to the top five importers 7 • The mean value of external growth for 
the panel with transition countries is 2 . 8  % with the highest value of 23 .26 % (Croatia in 
1 997) and the lowest - 1 0 .29 % (Latvia in 2009) (see Appendix A Table 3a). 
Oil Balance. This variable is measured as annual net exports of oil8 (exports of 
oil minus imports of oil), in percent of GDP. It is assumed that higher prices of oil have a 
positive effect on recovery and economic growth, particularly for oil abundant countries .  
Thus, a positive coefficient is expected for this variable .  As can be seen from Appendix 
A Table 3b (Panel I), the mean of oil balance is -0 . 1 2  %, the highest value is 65 . 1 4  % 
(Turkmenistan, 1 996) and the lowest is -22.03% (Belarus in 20 1 1 )  (see Appendix A 
Table 3b). The major oil exporters in the sample are Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Russia, and 
Turkmenistan. Thus, overall ,  the majority of transition countries in the sample import 
more oil products than they export. 
Regional Tensions. Regional tensions is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if 
the country experiences a militant conflict, war, or ethnic violence in a particular year. In 
related studies, it is a commonly used explanatory factor. It is hypothesized that a 
conflict has an adverse impact on economic recovery and economic performance of the 
country. Thus we expect a negative sign for this variable .  
Investment. Physical investment (gross capital formation) is one of the leading 
factors of economic growth for market economies, which allows for stable income over 
time . Even if the investment is a standard determinant of growth, in the studies on 
7 Pavletic & Sattler (2009) define external growth in a similar way. 
8 Oil includes crude petroleum, petroleum gases, liquefied petroleum gases, and miscellaneous bituminous 
mixtures. 
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transition economies, it often turns to be insignificant or of opposite sign (Fidrmuc, 
2003) .  One of the explanations that researchers give for this is that the time period 
available is not yet long enough to notice an impact of investment on growth (Falcetti et 
al . ,  2006). Besides, Falcetti et al . (2006) do not include investment in their study, 
because of the poor quality of the data. 
However, since the present research is the most recent one with the longest time 
period available, there should be enough time passed for investment to have a noticeable 
effect on growth. Therefore, investment is included in the study. We expect a positive 
relationship between investment and growth. In our dataset, the mean of investment is 
25 .56  % of GPD with the lowest value of -0.69 % of GDP (Azerbaijan in 1 992) and 
highest of 59 .77 % of GDP (Moldova in 1 992) (see Appendix A Table 3b (Panel I)) .  The 
negative value of investment for Azerbaijan could be explained by the high depreciation 
of capital and low enough investment. 
Government Expenditure. Government expenditure is a proxy for the degree of 
state ' s  influence in the economy. Keeping in mind the peculiarity of transition countries, 
the size of the government in these countries is essential for growth performance. If no 
substantial change occurred from the time of central planning, wasteful government 
expenditure could hurt the growth of the transition economies. Recognizing that the role 
of the government is remaining high in the majority of former Soviet countries, we 
assume that there is a negative relationship between government expenditure and 
economic growth. 
Like investment, government expenditure is rarely used in similar studies. 
Fidmuc states :  "Some of the variables that are usually found to be important determinants 
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of growth in market economies are either insignificant (government expenditure) or even 
appear with the wrong sign (investment)." (2003, p. 590). However, in a recent study 
"Economic Growth in Transition Economies - The Role of the Great Recession" Sharpe 
and Cannonier (2016) use both investment and government expenditure for their growth 
estimation and find them to be statistically significant. 
High Inflation (infl*hinflh). After estimating our econometrical model, inflation 
alone was not found to be statistically significant, while the dummy variable for high 
inflation was significant. In order to account for the level of inflation, the interaction 
term was created (infl*hinflh). High inflation is calculated as an interaction term 
between inflation and a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a country experiences 
an inflation that is higher than 50% and 0 otherwise. At the start of the transition, often 
inflation had extremely high values, which is why fiscal balance is the main proxy for 
macroeconomic stabilization in the economic model. From Appendix A Table 3b (Panel 
I), we can see that the maximum value of inflation is 15 607 % (Georgia in 1994) and the 
smallest value is -8.53 % (Azerbaijan in 1999), whereas a mean value is 150.9%. 
Clearly, such extreme values for inflation would have a harmful effect on economic 
growth; therefore, we assume that injl*hinjlh has a negative correlation with economic 
growth. 
Financial Crisis Dummy Variable (Cris). Cris is a dummy variable that takes a 
value of 1 from 2008 to 2014 and 0 otherwise. It is assumed that financial crisis of 2008 
leads to a structural break in the data. Since the crisis had a very harmful effect on both 
transition and non-transition countries (many fell in a recession), we expect a negative 
coefficient for this dummy variable. This variable is used only for the estimation with 
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Panel II to save the degrees of freedom in the analysis with Panel I (since Panel II has 
more observations) (see Appendix A Table 2). 
Democracy Index. Democracy index is calculated as the average of the civil 
l iberties and political freedom indicators (Fidrmuc & Tichit, 2009). As reported by 
multiple studies on the relationship between reforms and growth, political freedom and 
civil l iberties do not affect economic growth directly, but they do so indirectly through 
the reforms (De Melo et al . ,  200 1 ;  Falcetti et al . ,  2006 ; Pavletic & Sattler, 2009). In other 
words, democracy index has an impact on the reforms, which in tum affects economic 
growth. The data for the Democracy index is obtained from Freedom House and the 
variable ranges from 0 (no democracy) to 1 (full democracy) 9• 
Even if the relevant literature heavily emphasizes on the positive impact of 
democracy on economic growth, many empirical papers inferred otherwise. It is assumed 
that democracy can positively influence growth by safeguarding property rights 
(Przeworski & Limongi, 1 993) .  However, democracy can have an adverse impact on 
growth through high government consumption. In other words, the more democratic 
country is, the higher government consumption would be in that country, leading to lower 
growth rate over time (Cooper, 1 997). Moreover, it is considered that it is economic 
development that has an impact on democracy and not the other way around. Thus, the 
impact of democracy on economic growth is ambiguous. 
9 For Political Right: "Countries and territories with a rating of 1 enjoy a wide range of political rights, 
including free and fair elections." (Freedom House, 20 1 6) 
For Civil Liberties: "Countries and territories with a rating of 1 enjoy a wide range of civil liberties, 
including freedoms of expression, assembly, association, education, and religion." (Freedom House, 20 1 6) .  
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3.2. Endogeneity and Stationarity 
The variables were checked for the problem of endogeneity and presence of unit 
roots . All the variables, except for reforms, tum out to be endogenous 1 0 ; however, a few 
variables such as investment, oil balance, and fiscal balance are found to be stationary at 
first differences 1 1 , while other variables are stationary at level 1 2• Therefore, for the 
analysis, we are taking the first differences for these variables. We have tried to find a 
proper instrument for reforms (such as civil l iberties) but failed to do so . However, 
running 3 SLS model, accounting for the endogeneity of reforms, we have noticed that the 
results are similar to the findings of the GLS estimation. With this in mind, we treat 
reforms as exogenous in out model estimation, though realizing this limitation. 
3.3. Calculation of Initial Conditions by PCA 
EBRD ( 1 999) 1 3 and the study by De Melo et al . (200 1 )  implemented a novel way 
to measure initial conditions using several indicators characterizing the starting 
conditions of transition countries .  For example, De Melo et al . used 1 1  indicators 1 4 for 
calculation of initial conditions index. Based on indicators, an index for initial conditions 
using PCA was created (200 1 ). A composite index of the initial conditions was widely 
10 In Stata we have used stivrer2 command, which allowed us to check endogeneity of the variables using 
such tests as The Sargan-Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions, weak identification test (with Cragg­
Donald statistic) and underidentification test. To doublecheck, we have checked the significance of 
residuals, obtained from regressing each explanatory variable on the maintaining variables, in our main 
model . The residuals from reforms equation were found to be significant. 
11 In the Panel II, four variables turned out to be stationary at first difference, which are investment, oil 
balance, fiscal balance, and government expenditure. 
1 2 In order to check the stationarity of series in unbalanced panel ,  dicker-fuller test was run for each 
country, and if more than half countries in the sample had a unit root, this variable was considered non­
stationary. All non-stationary variables became stationary at first differences. 
1 3 See Box 2 . 1 .  in EBRD report ( 1 999) for more details about initial conditions index estimated with PCA. 
1 4 Here are 1 1  indicators: per capita GNP at PPP US$ 1 989, urbanization (% of population 1 990), predicted 
share of industry (%), location, natural resources, average growth ( 1 985 -89)(%), repressed inflation 1 987-
90, trade dependence 1 990 (%), black market premium 1 990 (%), independence and development of state 
institutions, and years under central planning (De Melo et al . ,  200 1 ) .  
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used in subsequent research (e.g .  Falcetti et al . ,  2002 ; Falcetti et al . ,  2006 ; Pavletic & 
Sattler, 2009; Fidrmuc & Tichit, 2009 ; and others) . 
It is not easy to measure initial conditions because multiple indicators could be 
used to account for the differences among transition countries at the start of the transition. 
S ince it is not possible to use all suitable indicators (due to a multicol linearity problem), 
PCA is used. This methodology allows the use of many variables for creating composite 
indexes (with the help of factor analysis) to estimate principal components . Factor 
analysis is used to identify the patterns of mutual variation in a set of variables and create 
clusters of variables ( eigenvectors, also known as principal components),  which 
characterize distinct dimensions of initial conditions. Such principal components can be 
used in regression analysis .  
The present study follows the approach of De Melo et al . (200 1 ), using similar 
variables for determining initial conditions index. PCA was conducted using eight 
variables (see Appendix Table 2 for the variables list and Table 5 for correlation matrix) . 
However, the sample of De Melo et al . also included China and Vietnam, which have 
different characteristic (distance, years under central planning and others) compared to 
FSU and CEEC countries .  Including such diverse Asian countries could create a bias in 
initial conditions index, which is why they are excluded from the sample in the present 
research. 
Even if there are as many principal components as there are variables used in 
PCA, only a few first components explain most of the variability. To choose a number of 
principal component for a study, the eigenvalue of a principal component should be 
bigger than one, and cumulative proportion of variance explained should be within the 
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70-80% range (Suhr, 2005) .  The results of PCA are presented in Appendix A Table 6, 
where we can see that consistent with the above mentioned standard criteria, first two 
components should be used for analysis (eigenvalues of comp 1 and comp2 are higher 
than 1 ,  and their cumulative proportion is more than 70%). However, for simplicity, we 
focus only on the first principal component because it explains more than 50 % (58%) of 
the variance in IC.  This criterion is used in the studies of Falcetti et al . ,  2002 and Falcetti 
et al . ,  2006. A dominance of the first principal component can be seen from scree plot of 
eigenvalues (see Appendix A Figure 1 ) . Therefore, in the present study, countries'  scores 
for initial conditions are calculated only using first principal component. 
As can be seen from Table 7 in Appendix A, the first component allocates 
substantial weight on six factors : share of agriculture, distance from Brussels, repressed 
inflation, black market premium and years under central planning. Given these factors, 
initial conditions (first principal component was used as a proxy) measure 
macroeconomic distortion passed on from central planning system. So, countries with 
higher values for repressed inflation, black market premium, years spent under central 
planning, distance to EU, and share of agriculture have a higher value for the first 
principal component, implying worse initial conditions at the start of the transition . 
Concerning the second principal component, only initial income per capita and 
abundance in energy resources seem to be important; therefore, it measures the level of 
development (See Appendix A Table 7). So, countries score high on second principal 
component if they are abundant in energy resources and have a high income per capita at 
the start of the transition. 
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We can group sample countries along two principal components : macroeconomic 
distortion from central planning system and the level of development (see Figure I). 
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Figun 1. Ranking of Transition Countries by the First Two Components 
Since we only use first principal component for our analysis, we focus our 
discussions around it only. Looking only at the first principal component (horizontal 
axis) enables us to identify three rough groups of countries .  The first group comprises 
the majority of Central and Eastern European as wel l  as South East European countries, 
which are characterized by high negative scores (favorable initial conditions) due to their 
proximity to Europe, fewer years under central planning, lower shares of agriculture, and 
less unstable macroeconomic situations compared to FSU states (see Appendix A Table 8 
for counties' scores) . The second group contains the Baltic states, Western CIS 
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countries, and such countries as Armenia, Georgia, and Mongolia. Finally, the last group 
of countries consists of Central Asian countries and Azerbaijan, which have the highest 
positive scores, meaning that they have the worst initial conditions. Though, it is 
important to note that there is no particular variable that drives the clustering of countries 
into groups. 
Lastly, we have conducted a Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin test on sampling adequacy to 
check if the chosen variables are suitable for factor analysis. In appended A Table 9, we 
can notice that kmo is higher than 0 .5 ,  which implies that the sample is appropriate for the 
PCA. 
3.4. Limitations of the Data 
As mentioned earlier, it was challenging to obtain the data for transition countries 
particularly for the initial years of transition, which is why unbalanced panels are used for 
model estimation. Due to the lack of data for all countries for the entire time span ( 1 990-
20 1 4  ) ,  we could not account for human capital (education) and money supply (broad 
money), which are important for growth models. Besides, this empirical l iterature 
usually includes foreign direct investments as a share of GDP, as a control variable, to 
examine the effects on a host country ' s  development effort. However, as it is not 
statistically significant, it is dropped from the analysis to save degrees of freedom. 
Moreover, due to the lack of data for all variables, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Montenegro, and Serbia were excluded from the sample. As a result, the panel with 
transition countries has 26 transition countries in the sample for the longest time span 
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available, 25 years ( 1 990-20 1 4) 1 5 • So, the number of observations in this study is 
relatively small , implying that our estimates might not be as robust as we might want 
them to be. However, adding 1 2  advanced European countries increases the number of 
observations and might improve the robustness of the results . Nevertheless, we should be 
cautious when interpreting the results . To check the robustness of our model, we run 
multiple models using various approaches (see Chapter V for details) .  
3.5. Hypotheses 
Based on this chapter and l iterature review, the following six hypotheses are 
formulated that are tested with econometric models .  
1 .  The significance of initial conditions on economic performance declines over 
time. 
2. Time trend is positively correlated with growth over time . 
3 .  Fiscal balance has a positive effect on economic growth, while high inflation 
has an adverse impact on growth. 
4 .  Lagged reforms have a positive impact on  economic growth. 
5 .  External growth, investment, and oil balance are positively correlated with 
growth. 
6 .  Dummy variables for regional tensions (RT) and the financial crisis (Crisis) 
have negative impacts on growth. 
Next chapter presents the methodology used to test these hypotheses. 
1 5 Year 20 1 5  was dropped from the study because of lack of data for many countries. Besides, EBRD 
transition indicators discontinued in 20 1 4. 
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IV. Methodology 
This chapter describes the methodology used for the analysis and provides the 
rationality for the method chosen (GLS).  
4.1. Method of the Study 
Economic Performance. The present study expands on the empirical analysis by 
Falcetti et al . (2006). To answer our research question of what explains growth 
performance of transition countries,  the following modified model is used : 
( 1 )  Growthu = /Jo+ /JJIC*t; + /J2t+ fJ3Exgrowthu+ fJ4Jnvu + /JslReformsit + /36 Fisbalu 
+ /J1RTit /JsOilbalit + /J9Govexpu + /J10Injl *hinjl+cu 
Where, 
Growthit = Annual growth rate of real GDP in country i at year t. (%) 
IC*ti = Interaction term between Initial conditions in country i and time . (index) 
t=transition time 
Exgrowthit= External growth in country i at year t. (%) 
lnVit= Investment in country i at year t. (% of GDP) 
IReformSit = Lagged average reforms in country i at year t. (index) 
Fisbali1 =Fiscal Balance in country i at year t. (% of GDP) 
RTit=Dummy variable for regional tensions in country i at year t. 
OilbaL1= Oil balances in country i at year t. (% of GDP) 
Govexpit = Government expenditure in country i at year t. (% of GDP) 
Infl*hinfl= Interaction term between inflation and a dummy variable for high inflation 
(%) 
The above model is estimated for the Panel I, and due to many explanatory 
variables and small sample size, the estimation is first conducted with core variables only 
( Ic*t, t, Exgrowth, Inv, !reforms, Fisbal, and RT) and additional variables are added to 
the main model separately. For the panel with non-transition countries, a log of income 
per capita in 1 990 is used as a proxy for initial conditions, and a dummy variable for the 
financial crisis of 2008 is added to the equation ( I) (see Appendix A Table 2). Most of 
the earlier mentioned variables are widely used in related studies (e .g .  Fischer & Sahay, 
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2000; De Melo, et al, 200 1 ;  Falcetti et al . ,  2006 ; Pavletic & Sattler, 2009; Fidrmuc & 
Tichit, 2009; Del l '  Anno & Villa, 20 1 3 ;  Sharpe & Cannonier, 20 1 6  and others) .  
Economic models are estimated with GLS method. This approach was chosen 
due to the problem of heteroscedasticity. Prior to identifying this methodology, we have 
experimented with pooled OLS and panel data (see Chapter IV Table 3 for the results of 
panel data) . The Hausman Test indicated that Fixed Effects should be used in the panel 
data analysis .  A Modified Wald test for groupwise heteroscedasticity 1 6 was run after 
estimation of panel model with fixed effects, and the presence of heteroscedasticity was 
detected. One of the assumptions of OLS is homoscedasticity (the error variances are 
homoscedastic), and when is it not satisfied the OLS estimates are no longer efficient, 
and the standard errors are biased, even if the estimated coefficients will be unbiased and 
consistent (Kuan, 2004) . 
Therefore, in order to obtain efficient and unbiased estimates, another estimation 
technique should be implemented, which would be able to transform the old model with a 
new one, where error terms are homoscedastic .  GLS is able to do just this .  Therefore, 
for our econometric analysis, GLS is used. Thus, compared to a study of Falcetti et al . 
(2006) and other similar studies, this study does not only differ by a new estimation 
technique used (GLS), but also by examining the effects of the classical growth variables 
such as investment and government expenditure on growth performance.  A relatively 
long time span from the time of central planning allows us to estimate more precisely the 
16 Ho: homoskedasticity (or constant variance). Chi2 for this test is 78880.78 with a prob>chi2 of 0.00.  
Thus, the panel ( with al l  countries) suffers from heteroscedasticity. 
3 2  
effects of these variables on growth, which were ignored or found to be insignificant in 
the previous research (Fidrmuc, 2003). 
Reforms. To check the effects of democracy and initial conditions on economic 
growth, we estimated the following model :  
Where, 
ReformSit =Average reforms in country i at year t. (index) 
Lgrowthit = Lagged ( 1  year) annual growth rate of real GDP in country i at year t. (%) 
Demit= Democracy index in country i at year t. (index) 
This model is similar to the ones that are used in studies by Falcetti et al . (2006) and 
Pavletic and Sattler (2009), who examined reforms and its determinants. 
Due to limitations of the dataset (small sample size, unbalanced panel ,  and poor 
quality of data for a few variables), it is important to check the robustness of the models 
by comparing the results of GLS estimation with the output of other estimating 
techniques .  In the next chapter, the results of different estimation approaches (Pooled 
OLS, Panel Data, and GLS), population samples (transition countries only and including 
non-transition countries), and time periods (al l  years and excluding first five transition 
years) are presented.  
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V. Empirical Results 
The current chapter reports major empirical findings from the data analysis and 
elaborates on each of the hypotheses mentioned in Chapter III .  In this way, this chapter 
addressed the second objective of the study, which is to conduct an empirical study to 
find out the effect of the key determinants of economic performance for transition 
countries. This chapter also discusses the impact of initial conditions and democracy on 
reforms; therefore, meeting the third objective of the study: to estimate the impact of 
initial conditions and democracy on reforms. The chapter starts with data analysis, 
followed by the robustness check for the validity of our estimates, hypotheses testing, and 
concludes with additional findings. 
5.1. Data Analysis 
Two unbalanced panels are used for data analysis :  the first (Panel I) consists of 26 
transition countries (Mongolia, FSU and CEE countries), whereas the second one (Panel 
11) is made up of 1 2  advanced European countries in the addition of 26 transition 
countries (see Appendix A Table 1 ) . European countries are added to the sample so that 
we can compare the results of two panels (I and II) and check if estimates differ 
substantially. 
Before estimating equation 1 ,  we have checked our model for the problems of 
multicoll inearity, heteroscedasticity, and autocorrelation with both panels (I and 11) . 
Since the results of the conducted tests are largely identical for both panels,  for brevity, 
only the results for Panel I (transition countries only) are reported in this section. To 
check for multicoll inearity, Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) command in STATA is used 
after running pooled OLS regression. As can be seen from Table 1 0  in Appendix A, VIF 
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values for all variables are below ten, implying that there are no serious problems of 
multicoll inearity between independent variables. Besides, from correlation table for 
Panel I (see Appendix A Table 4), we can see that that correlation between variables is 
relatively low. 
Concerning heteroscedasticity, the Breusch-Pagan, the White Test (conducted 
after Pooled OLS estimation), and the Modified Wald Test for groupwise 
heteroskedasticity (conducted in fixed effect regression model) showed the presence of 
heteroscedasticity (see Appendix A Table 1 1  for tests ' results) .  The presence of 
heteroscedasticity in our analysis is the main reason for using GLS estimation, which 
controls for this issue. Lastly, the Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data is 
conducted to check for the problem of autocorrelation. The results indicate the presence 
of autocorrelation in the data (see Appendix A Table 1 1  ) .  With this in mind, we use such 
STATA options as corr (psarl) and panels (heteroskedastic) with a xtgls command to 
control for autocorrelation within panels and heteroskedasticity across panels 
respectively. Thus, we can expect efficient and unbiased coefficients for our variables. 
Transition Countries (Panel I). For our analysis, we use the unbalanced panel 
for the period of a maximum of 25 and minimum 23 transition years (see Appendix A 
Table 2 for details on transition time) . The highest number of observation for this 
analysis is 580. Results of GLS estimation are presented in Table 1 below. To the 
benchmark regression (column 1 ), three extra variables are added individually, which are 
oil balance (column 2), government expenditure (column 3), and an interaction term 
between inflation and a dummy variable for high inflation (infl*hinfl) (column 4). We 
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Table 1 
Determinants of Growth: GLS Estimation (Panel I) 
( 1 )  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES GLS GLS GLS GLS GLS GLS 
(excluding 
first 5 
years) 
IC*t 0 .05 1 6* * *  0 .0527* * *  0 .0428* * *  0.0540* * *  0 .0432* * *  0 .0 1 05 
(0.00867) (0.0087 1 )  (0.00930) (0.00803) (0.0086 1 )  (0.00679) 
t 0 .0774* 0 .05 1 5  0 .0474 0 .0760* *  0 .0 1 86 -0 .0332 
(0.0404) (0 .040 1 )  (0 .0434) (0.03 84) (0.0407) (0 .0333) 
Exgrowth 0 .503 * * *  0.495 * * *  0.488* * *  0 .496* * *  0 .476* * *  0.497* * *  
(0.0469) (0.0479) (0.0468) (0.0472) (0 .0484) (0.0447) 
Inv D l  0 .336* * *  0 .3 5 1 * * *  0 .325 * * *  0 .345 * * *  0 .348* * *  0 .378* * *  
(0.0276) (0.0283) (0.0275) (0 .0280) (0.0285) (0.0320) 
Lreforms 4.466* * *  4 .537* * *  4 .649* * *  3 .97 1 * * *  4 .038* * *  -0 .532 
(0.3 82) (0.449) (0.400) (0 .365) (0.450) (0.474) 
Fisbal D I  0 . 1 40* * *  O . I 29* * *  0 . 1 35 * * *  0 . 1 72* * *  0 . 1 50* * *  0 .0773 * *  
(0 .0305) (0.0306) (0 .0307) (0.0306) (0.0307) (0.03 88) 
RT -3 .239* * *  -3 .435 * * *  -2 .875 * * *  -3 . 1 99* * *  -2 .983 * * *  - I . 1 24 
(0. 892) (0.905) (0 .887) (0 .92 I )  (0.925) (0.703) 
Oilbal D I  0 .00273 -0 .00 1 1 1  0 .0945 * * *  
(0.03 I O) (0.03 1 I )  (0.03 50) 
Govexp -0 . 1 24* *  -0 . 1 44* * *  -0 .24 I * * *  
(0.05 88) (0.0540) (0.0508) 
Infl*hinfl 
0 .0009* * *  0 .00 1 0* * *  O .O I I 2* * *  
(0.00023) (0.00025) (0.00239) 
Constant - I 6 .0 I * * *  - I 5 .75 * * *  - I 4 .25 * * *  - 1 3 .77* * *  - 1 0 .74* * *  9 .738* * *  
( 1 .320) ( 1 . 569) ( 1 .738) ( 1 .277) ( 1 . 878) ( 1 .983) 
Observations 580 570 580 580 570 487 
N of coun 26 26 26 26 26 26 
Heteroskedastic and autocorrelation of type AR ( I ) 1 7 robust standard errors in 
parentheses. 
* * *  p<O .O I ,  ** p<0.05 ,  * p<O . 
add these three variables to the benchmark regression, and results are reported in column 
5 .  Therefore, column 5 reports the results of estimating equation 1 (see chapter IV) . 
1 7 AR ( 1 )  refers to first-order autorepression 
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As can be seen from Table 1 ,  all variables in a benchmark model (column 1 )  are highly 
statistically significant at 1 percent level except for time trend, which is significant at 1 0  
percent level .  All variables apart from regional tensions (RT) have positive coefficient 
signs, as expected. Additional variables that are added in columns 2 through 4 are also 
highly statistically significant except for oil balance . A negative sign for government 
expenditure can seem to be a surprising result, however, for transition economies, we 
would expect a negative relationship between growth and government expenditure . More 
about this surprising result can be found in the following section of the chapter. 
Regarding high inflation, the coefficient sign for this variable is negative, as we would 
expect. In column 5, where all the variables are included in the regression, all variables 
maintain statistically significant at 1 percent level, expect for oil balance and time trend, 
which tum out to be insignificant. 
We notice that the coefficient values for the majority of variables in column 5 are 
similar to the ones that are in column 1 through 4, except for the time trend, which loses 
its statistical significance, and oil balance, which remains insignificant, but with an 
opposite coefficient sign. This change could be caused by decreased degrees of freedom 
in the estimation. Therefore, for brevity, from now on, we will use a regression with a 
full set of variables for our interpretation and comparison. 
To examine the robustness of our model and outcome, we exclude first five 
transition years from our sample. The rationality behind this is the substantial decline in 
output, weak quality, and poor availability of data during the early years of transition, 
which could damage the measurement of growth. This way regression starts at the time 
37 
when most of the sample countries experience economic growth. The results are reported 
in column 6, where we can notice a few interesting changes compared to column 5 .  
F irst, the interaction term of initial conditions with time trend and transition time 
are no longer significant. Second, lagged reforms and regional tensions dummy variable 
tum out to be insignificant, while oil balance becomes highly statistically significant with 
a positive coefficient sign. One of the reasons for this result could be a lack of variation 
in lagged reforms, reduced number of conflicts and higher oil prices in the later years of 
transitions .  Third, the correlation of high inflation with growth becomes even more 
robust, while the significance of fiscal balance weakens when we exclude first five years 
of transition . The remaining variables in column 6 seem to be similar to the ones 
reported in column 5 .  However, it is important to note that due to a smaller number of 
observations (N=487) and smaller degrees of freedom compared to the baseline model, 
we should be cautious to the results reported in column 6 (with excluded first five years) . 
European Countries (Panel II). For our analysis ,  we use an unbalanced panel 
with the transition and non-transition countries for the period of 25 transition years. The 
highest number of observations for this analysis is 879.  Results of GLS estimation are 
presented in Table 2 below. Apart from a different sample of countries in panel II, this 
analysis has other distinctions compared to the one conducted with Panel I .  First, due to 
the inclusion of non-transition countries, a log of initial GNI per capita in 1 990 (PPP 
terms) was used instead of IC index as a proxy for initial conditions. Second, due to high 
collinearity of 0 .98 between lninc90*t and t (see Appendix A Table 4), time is dropped 
from this analysis .  Third, to the benchmark regression (column l )  we add an additional 
variable, which is a dummy variable to account for the financial crisis of 2008 .  Thus, the 
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Table 2 
Determinants of Growth: GLS Estimation (Panel 11) 
( 1 )  (2) (3) 
VARIABLES GLS GLS GLS (excluding first 5 years) 
Lninc90*t 0 .00790* *  0 .03 I 5 * * *  O .O I 58* * *  
(0.0035 I )  (0 .0043 I )  (0.00426) 
Ex growth 0 .582* * *  0 .493 * * *  0 .500* * *  
(0.034 I )  (0.0640) (0 .0553) 
Inv D I  0 .3  I O* * *  0 .3 I 2* * *  0 .287* * *  
(0.0244) (0 .0407) (0.0405) 
Lreforms 4 .773 * * *  1 .728* * *  - 1 . 863 * * *  
(0.306) (0.265) (0.285) 
Fisbal D I  O . I I 7* * *  0 .257* * *  0 .0775 
(O .O I 96) (0 .04 I 9) (0 .0528) 
RT -3 .650* * *  -4 .529* * *  -2 . 899* * *  
(0 .989) (0 .8 I 4) (0 .763) 
Oilbal D l  0 . 1 02* *  0 .0295 
(0 .0504) (0 .0556) 
Govexp_D I -0 .324* * *  -0 .2 1 6* *  
(0.09 1 9) (0.0940) 
Infl*hinfl -O .OO I 83* * *  -0 .0 1 92* * *  
(0.000284) (O.OO I 94) 
Crisis - I . 864* * *  -4 .7 1 4* * *  -3 .353 * * *  
(0.367) (0.634) (0 .526) 
Constant - 1 8 .56* * *  -7.990* * *  8 .68 1 * * *  
( 1 . 1 32) ( 1 .0 1 3) ( 1 . I  77) 
Observations 879 823 70 1 
Number of coun 3 8  3 8  3 8  
Heteroskedastic and autocorrelation o f  type A R  ( 1 )  robust standard errors in 
parentheses. * * *  p<0.0 1 ,  * *  p<0.05 ,  * p<O . I 
model with a Panel II slightly varies from the one that uses Panel I for its analysis .  
As with Panel I, the same three variables (oil balance, government expenditure, 
and 1nfl*hinfl) are added to the baseline model (column 2).  Column 3 reports the 
estimates for all variables, where the first five years of our time period ( 1 990- 1 994) are 
excluded from the analysis. As can be seen from the table 2 above, all variables in the 
baseline model (column 1 )  are highly statistically significant with expected coefficients 
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signs.  In column 2, where additional three variables are added, we can see that they also 
tum out to be statistically significant with expected coefficients signs. 
Comparing the estimates reported in columns 3 with column 2, we can notice a 
few interesting changes. F irst, when the first five years of the studied time period is 
excluded from the analysis, the fiscal balance and oil balance variables lose its 
significance.  Second, even if lagged reforms stay significant in column 3, it has an 
opposite coefficient sign, which indicates that lagged reforms have a harmful effect on 
economic growth, at least in the short-run. This could be due to the uniformity of the 
variable in the later years of transition, particularly for non-transition advanced European 
countries, which we assume to have the maximum value of 4 .33 for reforms index. 
Third, as can be seen from coefficient values, the relationship between Lninc90 *t, RT, 
Govexp, and Cris and growth weakens, whereas the correlation between Infl *hinfl and 
Growth strengthen in the later years of transition. 
Comparing GLS Estimates with Pooled OLS and Fixed Effects. For 
comparison, we report not only the estimates of the main estimation method (GLS) but 
also OLS and Fixed Effects (FE) estimates .  The results with a full set of variables are 
presented in Table 3 below. As can be seen from Table 3, such variables as external 
growth, investment, and high inflation remained its statistical significance and expected 
coefficients signs in all specifications (GLS, OLS, FE). Initial conditions (IC*t and 
Lninc90*t) are statistically significant with expected positive coefficient in OLS, Fixed 
Effects, and GLS regressions; however, they lose their significance in GLS where first 
five years are excluded from the study. This could be due to a small number of 
observations and reduced impact of initial conditions with time. 
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Table 3 
Determinants of Growth: Different Estimation Methods 
( 1 )  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Pooled Panel FE GLS GLS GLS GLS (Panel 
OLS ( exc I .  first (Panel II) II, excl .  first 
5 �ears) 5 �ears) 
Lninc90*t 0 .03I 5 * * *  O .O I 58* * *  
(0 .0043 I )  (0.00426) 
IC*t 0 .042I * * *  0 .057 I * * *  0 .0432* * *  0 .0 1 05 
(0.00764) (O.O I 66) (0.0086 1 )  (0 .00679) 
0.0935 * * *  -0 .0927 O .O I 86 -0.0332 
(0.0338) (0.06 1 4) (0.0407) (0 .0333) 
Ex growth 0 .439* * *  0 .575 * * *  0 . 476* * *  0 . 497 * * *  0 . 493* * *  0 .500 * * *  
(0.0929) (0. 1 39) (0.0484) (0 .0447) (0.0640) (0 .0553) 
Inv D l  0 .35 I * * *  0 .276* *  0 .348* * *  0 . 378* * *  0 . 3  I 2* * *  0.287 * * *  
(0.078 I )  (O.  I 06) (0.0285) (0 .0320) (0 .0407) (0.0405) 
Lreforms 2.286* * *  6 .757 * * *  4.038* * *  -0 . 5 32 I .728* * *  - 1 .863* * *  
(0. 5 3 I )  (0.948) (0.450) (0.474) (0.265) (0.285) 
Fisbal D I  O . I 29 * *  0 . 1 73* *  O . I 5 0* * *  0 .0773* *  0 .257 * * *  0.0775 
(0.06 I I )  (0.0675) (0.0307) (0 .0388) (0.04 I 9) (0.0528) 
RT -3.700 * * *  -2.390 -2.983* * *  - 1 . 1 24 -4 . 5 29 * * *  -2.899* * *  
( 1 .088) ( 1 .753) (0.925) (0.703) (0 .8I 4) (0.763) 
Oilbal D I  0 .0873 0 .0778* -0 .00 I I l  0 .0945 * * *  0 . 1 02* *  0. 0295 
(0.0855) (0.04 I l )  (0 .031 1 )  (0 .0350) (0.0504) (0 .0556) 
Govexp -0 . 252* * *  -0 . 1 02 -0 . 1 44* * *  -0 .24 1 * * *  -0 .324 * * *  -0. 2 1 6 * *  
(0.0663) (0. 1 3 1 )  (0.05 40) (0 .0508) (0.09 1 9) (0.0940) 
Infl * hinfl -0 . 00 1 6 * *  -0 . 0009 * *  -0.0009 * * *  -0 .0 1 1 * * *  -0 .002* * *  -0 .0 1 92* * *  
(0.000676) (0.0004 1 6) (0.000249) (0 .00239) (0.000284) (0.00 1 94) 
Crisis -4 .7 1 4 * * *  -3.353* * *  
(0.634) (0 .526) 
Constant -2.75 1 - 1 9 .84 * * *  - 1 0 .74 * * *  9 .738* * *  -7 .990 * * *  8.68 1 * * *  
(2.377) (3.759) ( 1 .878) ( 1 .983) ( 1 .0 1 3) ( 1 .  I 77) 
Country FE yes 
effects 
R-squared 0 . 424 0 . 5 4 1 
N of coun. 26 26 26 38 38 
N of observ. 570 570 570 487 823 70 1 
Robust standard errors in parentheses shown in columns 1 and 2 and heteroskedastic and 
autocorrelation of type AR ( 1 )  robust standard errors shown in columns 3 to 6 
(* * *  p<O . O I ,  * *  p<0.05, * p<0. 1 )  
Notes: In column 1 ,  the results are derived by using Pooled OLS method. 
In column 2 ,  eq. 1 is estimated with simple OLS with Fixed Effects. 
In column 3, the results are derived by using GLS estimation. 
In column 4, first five years of transition are excluded from the analysis and the estimates are derived by 
using GLS estimation as in column 3 .  
I n  column 5 ,  GLS estimation was conducted with Panel II, which included non-transition advanced 
European economies. 
In column 1 through 4, the analysis is conducted with Panel I (only transition countries). 
In column 6,  estimates are derived using GLS estimation with Panel II, where first five years of transition 
were excluded from the analysis (estimation started from 1 995) .  
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Concerning time trend, it is only statistically significant in pooled OLS 
regression, whereas oil balance is statistically significant in GLS regression (without first 
five years), GLS regression (with Panel II) and FE regression at 1 0  percent significance 
level .  A dummy variable for the financial crisis of 2008 is statistically significant with 
expected negative coefficient signs in both specifications of GLS with panel II (columns 
5 and 6), indicating a harmful impact of financial crisis on economic growth. Regarding 
a dummy variable for regional tensions, it is statistically significant with a negative 
coefficient sign in all regressions except for FE and GLS (without first five years) .  The 
remaining variables, fiscal balance and government expenditure, maintain their statistical 
significance and anticipated coefficient signs in all model specifications besides GLS 
(Panel II) and FE estimations respectively. 
Comparing results of GLS estimation with Panel I and Panel II, we can notice that 
the coefficient of lagged reforms with Panel II ( 1 .728) is substantially lower than the one 
with Panel I (4 .038) .  Weaker effect of reforms in estimation with Panel II could be due 
to low variabi lity in the data since more than half countries in the sample have reached 
the maximum or c lose to maximum score in reforms. Moreover, in estimation with Panel 
II oil balance becomes highly statistically significant with a positive coefficient sign and 
the value of the coefficient for regional tenstions is much higher in Panel II ( -4 .529) than 
with Panel I ( -2 .983) .  Apart from these obvious changes, other explanatory variables do 
not vary much, indicating that including advanced European countries in the sample do 
not alter the results of the study much. 
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Keeping in mind the general similarity of the estimates in all regressions (OLS, 
FE, and GLS), we can infer that to a great extent our model is robust to different 
estimations methods . Therefore, for hypothesis testing and interpretation presented in the 
following section, we use mainly GLS estimation (Panel I), because it takes care of 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation issues (see Table 3 ,  column 3) .  
5.2. Hypotheses Testing 
Based on empirical results, each of the six hypotheses mentioned in chapter III 
was analyzed and, as a result, was either supported or not supported. The results are 
presented below. 
1 .  The significance of initial conditions on economic performance declines 
over time. 
According to our model (column 3 in Table 3), the interaction term of initial 
conditions with time trend, measuring the effect of the initial conditions over time, is 
highly statistically significant and has a positive value . Recall ing that the worse initial 
conditions, the higher is IC index, a positive coefficient for this variable implies that a 
harmful effect of the initial adverse conditions on economic growth declines with time . 
These results are consistent with other studies that show declining effect of IC over time 
(Heybey and Murrell , 1 999;  De Melo et al . ,  200 1 ;  Falcetti et al . ,  2002 ; Fischer and 
Sahay, 2004; Falcetti et al . ,  2006). Therefore, if IC were important for growth at initial 
years of transition, today their influence declined substantially, meaning that we cannot 
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justify current stagnation of several transition economies by its poor IC in 1 990 1 8 • 
Consequently, the first hypothesis is supported. 
2. Time trend is positively correlated with growth over time. 
As mentioned earlier, in GLS estimation time is not statistically significant, 
though it is significant at 1 0  percent level in baseline model of GLS estimation (see Table 
1 ,  column 1 )  and at 5 per cent level in GLS baseline regression with added high inflation 
(column 3) .  Statistical insignificance of time trend in a regression with a full set of 
variables could be due to too many independent variables, which take away degrees of 
freedom, harming the precision of model estimation. Besides, time trend is significant in 
OLS regression 1 9 • The coefficient for this variable is positive, implying that after the 
initial s lowdown, in general, economic growth increased (see Appendix B Figure 1 for 
counties ' growth pattern) . 
This result is compatible with other studies ( e.g.  Falcetti et al . ,  2002; Falcetti et 
al . ,  2006; Dell ' Anno & Villa; 20 1 3) ,  which show a positive statistically significant 
relationship between time trend and GDP growth. Thus, if we base our interpretation on 
a baseline model (Table 1 column 1 ), we support our hypothesis that time trend positively 
correlates with economic growth. On the other hand, if we consider GLS estimation for 
hypotheses testing, this hypothesis is not supported. 
1 8 Though, IC may have an indirect effect on performance of transition countries through government 
policies. 
1 9 Time was excluded from GLS estimation with Panel II ( non-transition countries) due to high collinearity 
of time with Lninc90 *t. 
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3. Fiscal balance has a positive effect on the economic growth, while high 
inflation has an adverse impact on growth. 
There is no doubt that sound stabilization policies are beneficial to economic 
growth. It is assumed that smaller budget deficits and lower inflation contribute to faster 
recovery and higher GDP growth of the economy. As we can see from our estimated 
model (Table 3, column 3),  both fiscal balance and high inflation ( Infl*hinfl) are 
significant at 1 percent significance level .  The coefficients for these variables have 
expected signs (positive for fiscal balance (0. 1 50) and negative for high inflation (-
0 .0009), implying that macroeconomic stabil ization (fiscal surplus and low inflation) has 
a positive impact on the economic performance of transition countries .  
Specifically, of those countries with high inflation, when inflation increases by 
1 00 percent (doubles from its mean value of 1 5 1 to 302 percentage points), ceteris 
paribus, GDP growth declines, on average, by 0 . 1 36 percentage points20 (from the 
growth' s  mean value of 1 .863 % to 1 .727 %) (see Appendix A Table 3a) .  Concerning 
fiscal balance, on average, if fiscal balance increases by one standard deviation (4 .337), 
ceteris paribus, economic growth will accelerate by 0 .65 1 percentage points2 1 • In other 
words, if an average growth is 1 .  863 %, increase of fiscal balance by one standard 
deviation results in the growth rate of 2 .5 1 4  %. 
As can be seen from the tables above this result is robust to almost all model 
specifications. Furthermore, the estimates for the macroeconomic stabilization variables 
20 It was calculated by multiplying coefficient of lnfl*hinfl ( -0 .0009) by its mean ( 1 50 .9) .  
21 Since fiscal balance is first differenced, the coefficient interpretation was calculated by multiplying 
coefficient of the indicator by its standard deviation (0. 1 50*4 .337= 0.65 1 ). 
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do not contradict with the findings from other related studies (e .g. F ischer and Sahay, 
2004 ; Falcetti et al., 2006 ; Pavletic & Sattler, 2009; Del l '  Anno & Villa; 20 1 3 ;  Sharpe & 
Cannonier, 20 1 6) .  Therefore, this  hypothesis is supported.  
4. Lagged reforms have a positive impact on the economic growth. 
Structural reforms, along with initial conditions and macroeconomic stabilization, 
is a standard explanatory factor of economic growth and recovery for transition countries .  
In our estimation, we use lagged reforms to account for the delay in the impact of reforms 
on GDP growth. This variable is found to be highly statistically significant at 1 percent 
level with a positive coefficient of 4 .38, implying a beneficial lagged effect of reforms on 
growth. This finding is correspondent with similar studies ( Falcetti et al., 2006; Fidrmuc 
& Tichit, 2009) 
To understand the meaning of coefficient for this variable, let ' s  consider a 
transition country that is progressed on one of the three EBRD transition indicators from 
3 .33 to 3 .66 (0 .33 is a numeric upgrade in one indicator) . Consequently, this change 
results in a rise of the average reforms for a country of 0 .3 3/3, or just over 0 . 1 .  Such 
increase (of 0 . 1 )  denotes an approximately one upgrade in rank across individual EBRD 
transition indicators. Hence, consistent with coefficient of lagged reforms of 4.03 8 ( see 
Table 3, column 3), an increase of 0 . 1 in reforms, ceteris paribus, is affiliated with an 
increase in GDP growth in the next year of approximately 0.4 percentage points as well 
as in each consequent year, given that the average reforms variable keeps its new value . 
Even if it seems like a tiny rise, accumulated increase in output over many years is 
substantial. Thus, the hypothesis is supported. 
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5. External growth, investment, and oil balance are positively correlated 
with growth. 
As follows from out estimated model {Table 3 ,  column 3) ,  both external growth 
and investment variables are highly statistically significant at 1 percent level; however, 
oil balance turns out to be insignificant in this estimation. Concerning external growth 
variable, it has a positive coefficient of 0 .476, which can be interpreted in the following 
way. On average, when external growth goes up by 1 percentage point, ceteris paribus, 
GDP growth increases by 0.48 percentage points or from its mean value of 1 . 86 % to 
2 .34%. As we can see, external growth has a considerable impact on economic growth. 
In general, this indicator proxies favorable effect of openness on growth (Dell '  Anno & 
Villa, 20 1 3) .  
A variable for investment, which is considered as a major driving force of a 
market economy, has a positive coefficient of 0 .348 .  Accordingly, if the investment (as 
% of GDP) increased by 1 standard deviation (4 .994), annual GDP growth22 accelerates 
by 1 .74 percentage points. To il lustrate, if growth is 1 . 86 % (at its mean value), an 
increase of investment by one standard deviation, results in 3 .60 % growth rate. 
Regarding oil balance, we can notice that even if it is not statistically significant in our 
main specification, it is highly statistically significant in GLS regression without first five 
years of transition (Table 3, column 4) as well as in GLS regression estimated with Panel 
II. This can be explained by higher oil prices in the later years of transition, and bigger 
sample (>30 countries) including large oil-exporting countries l ike Norway and 
22 Since investment is first differenced variable, the value for its interpretation was calculated by 
multiplying its coefficient by its standard deviation (0.348 *4.994= 1 .74). 
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Netherlands could reinforce the significance of this indicator. Though, we should note 
that the impact of oil balance on growth is very small .  
Above-mentioned results largely match other studies' findings ( e .g .  Falcetti e t  al . ,  
2002 ; Falcetti et  al . ,  2006 ; Pavletic & Sattler, 2009;  Del l '  Anno & Villa; 20 1 3) .  Thus, if  
we base hypotheses testing on GLS estimation (column 3), this  hypothesis is partly 
supported because even if both external growth and investment are statistically 
significant, oil balance is not. However, considering other specifications approached (FE 
and GLS (Panel II)), this hypothesis is supported. 
6. Dummy variables for regional tensions (RT) and financial crisis (Crisis) 
have negative impacts on growth. 
Recalling that a dummy variable for the financial crisis was only estimated with 
Panel II (with non-transition countries), this variable is interpreted based on GLS (Panel 
II) estimation (Table 3, column 5)23 • Both dummy variables are found to be statistically 
significant at 1 percent level with negative coefficient signs as expected. Reginal tensions 
dummy variable has a coefficient of -2 .98 ,  meaning that a conflict (international or local) 
has a considerable negative effect on economic growth. Specifically, if a country 
experiences a conflict in a particular year, ceteris paribus, its economic growth is 
expected to fall, on average, by almost 3 %. The finding is consistent with other relevant 
studies (e.g. De Melo et al . ,  200 1 ;  Fischer and Sahay, 2004; Fidrmuc & Tichit, 2009). 
23 Even though, the coefficient is largely identical in both GLS regressions with Panel I and Panel II, bigger 
sample size is chosen for estimation of a dummy variable for financial crisis to save degrees of freedom, 
since our benchmark model (column 3) has already many independent variables for a small number of 
observations . 
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A dummy variable for the financial crisis is based on the assumption of a 
structural break in the data due to a significant harmful effect of the financial crisis of 
2008 on economic growth. As can be seen from Table 3 (column 5), this variable is 
statistically significant at 1 percent level and has expected negative coefficient of -4 .7 1 4 ; 
thus, on average, during the financial crisis, ceteris paribus, country experiences decline 
in GDP growth by 4 .7 1 %. As we can see, this explanatory variable has a substantial 
adverse effect on economic performance. To the best of our knowledge, none of the 
earlier studied used a dummy variable for the financial crisis, expect for Sharpe and 
Cannonier (20 1 6), who used it in interaction term with a dummy for FSU countries. So, it 
is difficult to compare these findings with previous research. S ince both dummy 
variables are significant and have a negative impact on growth, this hypothesis is 
supported as well .  
As a result, al l  of our hypotheses were supported (given the flexibility to use other 
specification to test 2nd and 5th hypotheses) . More about the impact of democracy and 
initial conditions on reforms and other additional findings can be found in the following 
section. 
5.3. Additional Findings 
Government Expenditure. Unlike other explanatory variables, government 
expenditure variable has not been discussed in hypotheses testing section. The 
relationship between government expenditure and growth is ambiguous . If for market 
economies, usually, we would expect a positive relationship between government 
expenditure (as a stimulus for an economy), for transition countries it is vice versa. 
Recall ing that government expenditure is a proxy for a size of government, countries with 
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high government expenditure (big government) are more likely to be inefficient, which 
could harm economic growth. 
In the present study, government expenditure is found to be highly statistically 
significant with a negative coefficient sign, which is in agreement with a previous study 
by Sharpe and Cannonier (20 1 6) .  According to our main model (Table 3, column 3), on 
average, a l percentage point increase in government expenditure, ceteris paribus, 
decreases GDP growth by 0 . 1 4  percentages points . In other words, if growth rate was 
1 . 86%, which is the mean value, it will be 1 .  72% after a l percentage point increase in 
government expenditure. 
Democracy. It is argued that the impact of institutions (political right and civil 
l iberties) can be vital for economic growth. However, several empirical studies claimed 
(Falcetti et al . ,  2002 ; Fidmuc, 2003) that democracy does not have a direct effect on 
economic growth, but only indirect one, through its impact on economic reforms. In 
authoritarian countries, it is tough or often impossible to lobby for economic 
liberalization. Therefore, at the time of economic slowdown, undemocratic governments 
encounter less pressure from its citizen to implement economic reforms. Empirical 
studies (Falcetti et al . ,  2002 ; Fidmuc, 2003 ; Pavletic & Sattler, 2009) showed a positive 
relationship between political competitiveness and economic reforms. 
As mentioned in the l iterature review, the impact of democracy on economic 
growth is ambiguous. Recall ing that democracy ranks from 1 (full democracy) to 7 (no 
democracy), a positive coefficient of democracy index implies negative relationships 
between this variable and economic growth. From Table 1 2  (column l and 2) in 
Appendix A we can see that democracy has an overall negative impact on the GDP 
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growth (coefficient is 0 .68) .  However, if the analysis is conducted on country level for 
both democratic and authoritarian countries, we can notice that in more liberalized and 
democratic countries (e.g. Poland and the Czech Republic) democracy has a positive 
impact on economic growth, whereas in less l iberalized and democratic countries (e .g.  
Belarus and Russia), democracy has an adverse effect on growth (see Appendix 1 Table 
1 2, columns 3-6) .  One of the explanations for a negative impact of democracy on GDP 
growth could be favorable external conditions such as high oil price for oil-exporting 
countries (e .g. Russia) and increased external growth for open economies (e.g. Belarus), 
which boosted the economic growth of these countries despite deteriorating democracy in 
these countries. 
To study the effects of democracy and initial conditions on reforms, we estimate 
reforms equation 2 (see Chapter IV), which is dependent on initial conditions, 
democracy, time trend, growth, and lagged growth. The results of the equation 2 are 
presented in Table 1 3  in Appendix A, where such estimation tools as OLS, FE, and GLS 
are implemented for comparison purpose. As can be seen from the table, the results in all 
columns are largely similar. However, due to the problem of heteroscedasticity, we use 
GLS estimation for our interpretations . 
All variables in column 3 in Table 1 3  (Appendix A) are statistically significant 
and with expected coefficient signs. As we would expect, the coefficient for democracy 
index is negative, indicating its positive effect on reforms. Specifically, a one-unit 
increase in democracy index (deterioration of democracy) is associated with a decrease in 
average reform index of 0 . 1 8  or nearly two upgrades of EBRD individual transition 
indicators. In other words, the present study confirms a direct, significant, and favorable 
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effect of developed civil  liberties and political freedoms on reforms, which, in tum, 
positively influence economic growth. 
Concerning growth and lagged growth, these variables are found to be significant 
and positively correlated with reforms. This implies that if a country experience or 
experienced a high GDP growth, it is more likely to reform; thus, we can note reverse 
causality between growth and reforms. Therefore, keeping in mind the feedback effect 
between growth and reforms, reforms in one year enhances economic growth (see Table 
3 above) in the following year, and this complementary growth serves as an incentive for 
further market liberalization (reforms). Thus, several countries can experience this 
virtuous circle.  However, it is important to note that there are other factors (e.g. external 
growth, natural resource abundance) that can contribute to economic growth of a country, 
but at the same time prevent its market l iberalization. The example of this scenario can 
be Uzbekistan, which is rich in natural resources (arable land suitable for growing cotton 
and energy) . The country experienced a constant increase in economic growth, however 
without significant progress in reforms (see Appendix B Figures 1 and 2). 
Time trend has a positive coefficient, indicating a positive effect of time on 
market liberalization. Therefore, over transition time, we would expect reforms index 
increase substantially, and this pattern can be vividly seen in each country (except for 
Uzbekistan) from Figure 2 in Appendix B. Lastly, interaction term of initial conditions 
with time has a positive effect on reforms, which means that initial conditions do matter 
for market liberalization, however its impact is decreasing over time. These results are 
largely in accord with other comparable studies (Falcetti et al . ,  2006; Pavletic & Sattler, 
2009) . The following chapter discusses the findings and draws a conclusion of the study. 
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VI. Discussion and Conclusion 
This chapter meets the fourth objective of this study, which is to suggest 
interventions and policies that will aid in improving growth performance of the post­
communist countries based on the results of the study. The chapter consists of three 
parts; it begins with the discussion of the main empirical findings, followed by a section 
on limitations and further research suggestions, and finalizes with a section on policy 
implications for governments of transition countries and conclusion. 
6.1. Discussion 
To answer the research question "what explains growth performance of transition 
countries?" an econometric model with major determinants of growth for transition 
economies was implemented. As shown in Table 3 (column 3) all the independent 
variables were found to be statistically significant with expected coefficient signs except 
for oil balance and time trend, which were found to be statistically insignificant. From 
hypotheses testing presented in the previous chapter, all hypotheses were supported 
(given that we use different model estimations and specifications to test 2nd and 5th 
hypotheses) . 
To sum up, the study showed that structural reforms, investment, external growth, 
and fiscal balance have a significant positive effect on economic growth, whereas high 
inflation and high government expenditure have a negative impact on growth. Besides, 
the current study demonstrated a declining effect of initial conditions on growth as well 
as the indirect positive effect of democracy (institutions) on macroeconomic 
performance. The major empirical findings are discussed in details  below. 
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The Impact of Initial Conditions is Declining over Time. From our analysis, we 
can infer that even if initial conditions do matter for today' s growth performance of 
transition countries, its impact declines substantially over time. Thus, in present time 
(twenty-five years after the fall of communism), we cannot justify stagnation of an 
economy by its unfavorable initial conditions .  
For example, as  i l lustrated in Figure 2, initial conditions for Belarus, Azerbaijan, 
and Georgia were almost the same in 1 99024 (adverse) ; however, unlike Georgia and 
Azerbaijan, who managed to show substantial progress in reforms, Belarus failed to do so 
(see Appendix B Figure 2).  Another example would be Baltic countries, which were able 
to overcome relatively unfavorable starting conditions ( Figure 2) with the help of fast 
structural reforms and anti-inflationary policies (Fischer & Sahay, 2000). 
A positive relationship between initial conditions and reforms should not be 
underestimated. From the Figure 2 below, we can clearly see that countries that started 
with the worst initial conditions (IC index is close to 4) score the lowest on the average 
reforms ( e .g .  Turkmenistan, Belarus, and Uzbekistan), whereas the counties with the 
most favorable initial conditions score the highest on average reforms. In other words, the 
transition progress ( the extent of reforms) is positively associated with initial conditions ; 
that is the reformers are the countries that are with lower share of agriculture (as a 
percentage of GDP), with closer proximity to Western Europe ( Brussels), with shorter 
time period spent under communism, and with smaller macroeconomic economic 
24 According to author' s  estimation using PCA to derive an IC index for each country. 
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distortions ( lower repressed inflation and black market premium) at the start of the 
transition. This finding contributes to the explanation of why such 
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Figure 2. Reforms and Initial Conditions 
countries as Belarus and Turkmenistan are sti l l  stuck in transition . Besides, for many 
post-communist countries, the possibil ity to join the European Union was a strong 
incentive to conduct structural reforms (Fischer & Sahay, 2000). 
Reforms is a Vital Determinant of a Success of an Economy 's Transition25 or its 
Stagnation. The present study showed a significant positive effect of market-oriented 
reforms on growth performance of the transition countries .  Therefore, post-communist 
countries that reach a higher degree of economic l iberalization are more likely to 
25 Even if such terms as transition progress and reforms are used equivalently, we should bear this 
difference in mind. 
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experience higher economic growth, than the ones that are stuck in transition . A positive 
l ink between liberalization and growth can be vividly seen from Figure 3a and 3b in 
Appendix B.  
Figure 3a i l lustrates the relationship between average growth and reforms for the 
first five years of transition, where we can see that, compared to FSU republ ics, countries 
with a relatively high level of l iberalization (with high reforms index) in initial years 
were less vulnerable to the fal l  of output caused by regime change. To i l lustrate, at the 
upper right side of the graph, we can find mainly CEE countries, which are characterized 
by high scores on both structural reforms and growth. On the other hand, countries that 
ranked the worst on average reforms indicators (e .g .  Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Ukraine, 
Belarus, and Tajikistan) experienced sharp average growth decline in a range from -7% to 
- 1 6%. 
A similar trend can be seen from Figure 3b, which demonstrates the relationship 
between growth and reforms for the first ten years of transition . From this figures, we 
can observe that the countries that rank high on reforms (largely CEE countries with 
reforms index above 3 .25)  are associated with relatively higher growth rate than less 
l iberalized countries (the majority of FSU countries, circ led on the graph) . Concerning 
later year of transition (see Appendix B Figure 3c for the last five years of transition), we 
can witness that the majority of countries that experienced no growth or negative growth 
rate are the FSU countries (e.g. Belarus, Azerbaijan, Russia, Armenia, Moldova, Georgia, 
and Ukraine), which failed to make a substantial transition progress (circled in the graph) . 
On the other hand, relatively liberalized countries (mainly CEECs) experienced positive 
average GDP growth in the last five years of transition . Thus, from this finding, we can 
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infer that a poor economic performance of FSU countries can be explained for the most 
part by slow implementation of structural reforms. 
However, from Figure 3d in Appendix B, showing the relationship between 
average growth and reforms for al l available transition years, it is harder to see a clear 
positive l ink between growth rate and l iberalization. Even though we can remark that 
only three FSU republics (Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine) experience average negative 
growth rate, we can also note the other three FSU outsiders (Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, 
and Belarus) have remarkably high growth rate, despite its failure to l iberal ize their 
economies. For example, Uzbekistan was able to sustain strong growth due to high 
cotton export and its energy self-sufficiency, whereas for Belarus it was beneficial c lose 
trade relationship with Russia (Fisher and Sahay, 2000). Besides, these countries have 
been heavily investing in housing, which helped to boost domestic demand and decrease 
unemployment (Fisher and Sahay, 2000). 
Even if reforms is a vital determinant of economic growth in transition countries, 
alone it fai l s  to explain growth. Hence, some or al l  of other significant explanatory 
factors used in our study (e. g. inflation, fiscal balance, external balance, investment, 
regional conflicts, and government expenditure) might be responsible for explaining 
recent high GDP growth in countries that were reluctant to reform. Moreover, it should 
be noted that, depending on the level of development, stabil ity, poverty and other 
essential issues, reforms in one country might not be as successful as in another (Falcetti 
et al ., 2006) . Besides, since the relationship between growth and reforms is reciprocal, 
transition progress leads to higher economic growth, which contributes to further 
l iberalization. 
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The present study confirms that market l iberalization has a positive effect on 
economic growth (at least in the long run) . However, the question arises what impacts 
reforms and why a country chooses one or another transition path? It is important to 
real ize that the decision of a country to choose its transition path does not only depend on 
its economic scenario, but also its pol itical situation. So, the extent of political 
competition in the country can play a crucial factor in a choice of transition path. The 
empirical results of the present research demonstrated a robust positive effect of 
democracy (average of civil l iberties and pol itical right) on reforms, which is consistent 
with other relevant studies (De Melo, Denizer, & Gelb, 1 996; Pavletic & Sattler, 2009). 
Keeping this relationship in mind, we can infer that the extent of democracy in a 
country could have a substantial effect on the speed of reforms. Unsurprisingly, Sachs 
c laims that "the problem of reform is mostly political rather than a social or even 
economic one" ( 1 993 , p.  xiii) . Positive association of democracy with transition progress 
is c learly seen from the Figure 3 below. 
Recal l ing that democracy index ranks from I (full democracy) to 7 (no 
democracy), from Figure 3, we can see that countries with the lowest index for reforms 
(Turkmenistan, Belarus, Uzbekistan) are the ones that score highest (worst) on 
democracy. Likewise, countries (several CEECs and Baltic countries), which were able 
to make a remarkable transition progress, score lowest (best) on democracy index. So, 
countries with authoritarian regimes chose to reform very slowly to maintain status quo, 
whereas, countries which experienced a clear break from the past and later became EU 
members (Poland, Hungary, Czech Republ ic, Albania, Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia) 
chose to reform rapidly (De Melo et al . ,  1 996). Even though we have been talking only 
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about the impact of democracy (political freedom) on reforms, previous studies (De Melo 
et al ., 1 996;  Pavletic & Sattler, 2009) inferred that the relationship between these factors 
is actual ly reciprocal . Comprehensive reforms may improve democratization . First, 
reforms may help to destroy the pol itical power and, second, economic l iberalization may 
help to disconnect political power from economic power. The rationale behind this 
argument is that reforms stimulate independence among groups and people, in so doing it 
make people more courageous to demand more pol itical freedom (Pavletic & Sattler, 
2009). 
Gradualism or Bing Bang Approach. There is an ongoing debate about which 
approach a country should take for a better economic performance : "big bang" (rapid 
reforms) or gradualism (slow reforms). Since the speed of reforms is measured by the 
annual change in reforms index, a positive coefficient of this variable in our model (see 
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Table 3 )  supports the view for "Big Bang" approach. A significant positive effect of 
reforms on growth implies that speed of reforms do matter and rapid reforms are 
preferable to slow ones. Therefore, the economic performance of a country is better off 
in the long run if "big bang" or "shock therapy" (another name for rapid reforms) 
approach is taken. 
For example, unlike Poland, which successfully used shock theory approach as its 
transition strategy, Belarus, instead, chose to postpone reforms and keep a status quo, 
resulting in a higher inflation and lower growth rates in the long run. To illustrate, 
Poland' s  GDP growth and inflation in 20 1 4  were 3 .28 % and 0 . 1 2  % respectively, 
compared it to Belarus ' s  1 .72 % and 1 8 .58  % (International Monitory Fund, 20 1 6) .  
However, as  i t  was discussed earlier, robust relationship between political competition 
(democracy) and reforms suggests that a choice of transition strategy is often determined 
by the regime in the country. 
This empirical finding is consistent with the previous studies (Berg et al . ,  1 999;  
Fischer & Sahay, 2000);  however, it  contradicts with the findings of both Heybey & 
Murrell  ( 1 999) and Falcetti et al .  (2002), who claimed a small or no effect of reforms on 
growth. While Dell ' Anno and Villa argue that contemporaneous effect of speed of 
reforms on growth is negative, however, it is positive in the longer time span (20 1 3) .  
Stabilization is a Must. Nevertheless, just as initial conditions, reforms alone are 
not enough for sustainable growth of transition countries .  Other factors, such as 
macroeconomic stabilization, external growth, and regional tensions are important for the 
economic performance of post-communist countries .  Macroeconomic stabil ization (price 
stability) is a necessity for the proper functioning of markets and consistent investment. 
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The present study showed that high inflation and fiscal deficit have a significant negative 
impact on economic performance. A country-level estimation demonstrates a close link 
between economic growth and fiscal balance, particularly for Russia (see Appendix B 
Figure 4) .  However, at the initial years of liberalization, when economies experienced 
large output falls, tax revenues reduced substantially, explaining persisting fiscal deficit 
at that time. The finding is in accord with previous studies (Fisher & Sahay, 2000; 
Falcetti et al . ,  2006;), that showed that the earlier macroeconomic stabilization is 
undertaken, the faster is output recovery in transition economies . 
6.2. Limitation and Further Research 
The present study has a few limitations. F irst, our empirical model does not 
account for the impact of such significant growth factors as education, money supply, 
foreign direct investment, exchange rate, and others, mainly due to poor availability and 
quality of the data for all transitions countries .  Second, the population sample of the 
study consist of only of 26 transition countries, and a time period is maximum 25 
transition years, the sufficient limitation of the study, which could have affected the 
empirical results of the study. Thus, including more transition countries (e .g .  Serbia, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina26) and longer time span (future studies) could improve the 
credibility and precision of estimates .  
Third, the issue of quality of data, particularly in the initial years of transition, i s  
important. Besides, some countries at an early stage of transition had missing data 
points, which is why the unbalanced panel was used for our estimation. Moreover, our 
26 Were excluded from the study due to the lack of data for the majority of variables for these countries.  
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regression could be weighted by country population27, and GMM estimation could be 
implemented to get more precise estimates .  However, due to limited time and certain 
complications (with an estimation technique (GMM), data availability), we could not 
implement these improvements; therefore, they are left for further research in this area. 
However, regardless of issues with the data and model, the present study provides a 
decent estimation of the economic performance of transition economies. 
6.3. Policy Implication and Conclusion 
To answer our research question: "what explains growth performance of transition 
countries?", an empirical study was conducted with a sample of 26 transition countries 
for the period of 25 transition years ( 1 990-20 1 4  ). We estimated growth with the most 
common explanatory factors such as initial conditions, reforms, fiscal balance, 
government expenditure, oil balance, regional tension dummy variable, investment, and 
external growth using GLS estimation method. All the variables except for oil balance 
and time trend were found to be statistically significant with expected coefficient signs 
(see Table 3 column 3). Based on the literature review, we have formed six hypotheses, 
which were supported28 • 
Empirical findings of this  study confirm that growth performance can be 
explained by the degree of structural reforms, stabilization, and initial conditions along 
with other factors (external growth, regional tensions, and government expenditure) . As 
mentioned earlier, we have found that transition mainly driven by reforms, which are 
positively influenced by favorable initial conditions and high political competition 
27 Sharpe & Cannonier ( 20 1 6) weighted regressions by country population. 
28 All hypotheses are supported if we allow to use other than GLS estimations to test hypotheses 2 and 5 .  
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(democracy) . This suggests that authoritarian regime and unfavorable initial conditions 
help to explain why such countries as Belarus, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan are stil l  
stuck in transition. Furthermore, we have found that extra growth acts as an incentive for 
further reforms. 
Even if IC are important, they are only part of the story, and its impact 
consistently declines.  However, political competition in the country is vital for the 
transition progress. Strengthening political intuitions would not only improve reforms but 
have an indirect (through reforms) positive impact on economic performance of the 
countries. Concerning the impact of stabilization, we find that sound macroeconomic 
policies have a positive effect on growth performance of the countries .  Thus, for 
sustainable growth, the local government of the transition economies should target 
inflation and try to maintain a budget surplus. 
The results of the study demonstrated a harmful effect of excessive government 
expenditure on growth. This implies that transition countries should spend state money 
efficiently and do not waste money on ineffective projects or generous welfare programs. 
Moreover, investment has a significant positive impact on growth performance, which 
means that for sustainable growth, countries should increase investment. This result 
contradicts with finding in Fidrmuc ' s  (2003) study, which showed the insignificant 
negative impact of investment on growth, which could be due to the shorter time span of 
the study. Finally, external growth was found to have a positive influence on growth, 
suggesting that external demand has a beneficial impact on the macroeconomic 
performance of the transition countries. 
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The current study contributes to the literature on growth performance of transition 
economies. Explicitly, this research provided with the most recent summary of the 
macroeconomic performance of transition countries after 25 years since the transition 
began. Our main results are consistent with the previous studies, however unlike the 
majority of other papers, this  study checks for the significance of investment, government 
expenditure, the impact of the financial crisis of 2008 and compare the estimates of the 
study for transition countries only with a sample that includes advanced European 
countries. 
However, despite our best attempt to identify growth model correctly, use the best 
data available, and choose a right estimation method, the accuracy of our estimates might 
be influenced by other issues and poor quality of data. Therefore, we should be cautious 
when interpreting results and suggesting policies . However, given that robustness check 
showed that different estimations show similar results , the limitations of the analysis 
should be minimal, and our policy suggestion should remain relevant. 
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Appendix A 
Table 1 :  List of Sample Transition and Non-Transition countries 
Transition Countries 
Former Soviet Union Countries (FSU) 
and Mongolia (1 6) 
Armenia 
Azerbaijan 
Belarus 
Estonia 
Georgia 
Kazakhstan 
Kyrgyzstan 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Moldova 
Mongolia 
Russian Federation 
Taj ikistan 
Turkmenistan 
Ukraine 
Uzbekistan 
Central and Eastern European Countries 
(CEECs) (1 0) 
Albania 
Bulgaria 
Croatia 
Czech Republic 
Hungary 
Macedonia 
Poland 
Romania 
S lovak Republic 
S lovenia 
Non-Transition Countries 
European Countries (12) 
Austria 
Denmark 
Finland 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Portugal 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
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Table 2 :  Variables Definitions and Data Sources 
Variable Definition Data Source 
Database to estimate Initial Conditions (JC) by PCA 
Income per 
capita in 1 990 
(Inc90) 
Agriculture 
(Agr) 
Distance 
(Dist) 
Energy-rich 
Dummy 
(Enerich) 
Pre-transition 
growth rate 
(Prgr) 
Black Market 
Premium 
(Blcmkt) 
Repressed 
Inflation 
(Repinfl) 
GNI per capita in PPP 
terms in 1 990, in constant 
20 1 1 international dollars . 
Share of agriculture in 
1 989, in per cent of GDP. 
Geographic (flying) 
distance from capital of the 
country to Brussels 
(Belgium), in km. 
A dummy variable taking a 
value of 1 for Azerbaijan, 
Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, 
Norway, and Russian 
Federation, and 0 
otherwise . 
Average growth for the 
period of 1 985- 1 989, in 
percent. 
Black market premium for 
1 990, in percent. 
Repression inflation for the 
period of 1 987- 1 990. It is 
defined as the percentage 
change in real wages less 
the percentage change in 
real GDP30 • 
United Nations 
(Human Development Report) 
World Bank ( World Development 
Report of 1 99 1  )29 
Indo . com 
(http ://www . indo .com/distance/index) 
Countries abundant with energy 
resources (oil and gas particularity) are 
classified in Resource Rents and 
Economic Growth by Ranepa 
(Kaznacheev, 20 1 3) .  
The data is taken from De Melo et al . 
(200 1 )  
The data i s  taken from De Melo et al . 
(200 1 )  
The data i s  taken from De Melo et al . 
(200 1 )  
29 The missing data for Mongolia ( 1 989) and Switzerland ( 1 990) i s  taken from World Bank (WDI). 
30  The definition is  taken from De Melo et al . ,  200 1 .  
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Variable 
Years under 
Central 
Planning 
(Cenplany) 
Definition 
A number of years a 
country spent under central 
planning. 
Data Source 
The data is taken from De Melo et al .  
(200 1 )  
Databases to estimate GLS models for transition and European countries 
GDP Growth 
Rate3 1 
(Growth) 
Initial 
Conditions32 
(IC) 
Reforms33 
(Reforms) 
Annual Real GDP growth, 
in percent. 
Country scores were 
calculated from the first 
principal component of a 
Principal Component 
Analysis over eight 
indicators (GNI per capita 
in 1 990;  pre-transition 
growth rate ; energy-rich 
dummy, years spent under 
central planning, distance 
to EU, repressed inflation, 
black market premium, and 
share of agriculture) .  
A Simple average of three 
EBRD indicators (small­
scale privatization, price 
liberalization, Trade & 
Forex system) . EBRD 
rating ranks from 1 (no 
reform) till 4 .33 ,  
(equivalent to  the 
standards of the market 
economy) . 
International Monitory Fund (World 
Economic Outlook (WEO) reports of 
1 999 and 20 1 6) 
Own calculation (see the details about 
the dataset used for calculations of IC 
above) 
European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD) 
3 1 Missing data for the period of 1 990- 1 995 for Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Croatia, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Macedonia, Slovak Republic, and Slovenia was taken from EBRD ( 1 999). 
The missing data for 1 990 for CIS countries was retrieved from WDI, and the data for Lithuania was taken 
from the World Bank ( 1 993) .  
32 IC index is calculated only for transition countries.  For dataset with European countries, Jog of initial 
GNI Per capita in PPP terms in 1 990 (constant 20 1 1  international dollars) is used as a proxy for initial 
conditions . The data is taken from the United Nations Database .  
33  For the European advanced economies, 4 .33 is used for al l  indicators . 
7 1  
Variable 
F iscal 
Balance 
(Fisbal) 
Oil Balances 
(Oilbal) 
External 
Growth35 
(Exgrowth) 
Time 
(t) 
Definition 
The consolidated balance 
of the budgetary central 
government/ general 
government that covers 
operations of budgetary 
central government, 
extrabudgetary units, 
social security funds, and 
state and local 
governments, in percent of 
GDP. It is negative in case 
of fiscal deficit. 
Annual net export of oil ,  
percent of GDP. 
A weighted average of 
Real GDP growth in five 
top trading partners of a 
country i at year t divided 
by the sum of weights, 
where the weights are the 
share of total exports to the 
top 5 importers . 
Transition time starts from 
1 990 for CEECs (except 
for Albania), 1 99 1  for 
Baltic countries and 
Albania, 1 992 for FSU 
countries. For the first year 
of transition, t= l .  
Data Source 
International Monitory Fund 
(Government Finance Statistics (GFS) 
Reports) 
The Observatory of Economic 
Complexity (OEC)34 
World Integrated Trade Solution 
(WITS)36 , World Bank37, IMF, UN 
Com trade 
34 For missing values the data was taken from The Atlas of Economic Complexity. 
35 The data for external growth for the Czech Republic and Slovak Republic for 1 990- 1 992 was taken from 
paper by Del l '  Anno & Villa, 20 1 3 .  
3 6  Gross exports with Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) are used for calculation of 
weights . 
37 The data for annual real GDP growth was taken from WDI. Missing data for Serbia and Montenegro was 
taken from Central and East European Handbook (Heenan & Lamontagne, 2000). The data for Serbia for 
1 996-2002 and 2004 was taken from the UN database and it was proxied for Serbia and Montenegro (since 
Serbia was a larger economy). The data for GDP growth for USSR for 1 990 and 1 99 1  was taken from the 
article by Fischer, 1 994. 
7 2  
Variable 
Investment 
(Inv) 
Government 
Expenditure39 
(Govexp) 
Inflation 
(Infl) 
High Inflation 
Dummy 
Variable 
(hinfl) 
Definition 
Gross capital formation38, 
in per cent of GDP. 
General government final 
consumption expenditure, 
in per cent of GDP. 
Inflation, average 
consumer prices (index), in 
per cent. 
A dummy variable that 
takes a value of 1 if 
inflation is greater than 
50%, and 0 otherwise. 
Data Source 
World Bank (World Development 
Indicators ( WDI) 
World Bank (WDI) 
International Monitory Fund (WEO); 
European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development40 
Regional 
Tensions 
(Rt) 
A dummy variable taking a 
value of 1 if a country 
experiences a militant 
conflict, war, or ethnic 
violence in a particular 
year and 0 otherwise . 
Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), 
Center for Systemic Peace 
Crisis 
(Cris) 
Democracy 
(Dem) 
A dummy variable to 
account for the financial 
crisis, which is taking a 
value of 1 from 2008 to 
20 1 4  and 0 otherwise. 
Democracy index is Freedom House4 1 
calculated as an average of 
political freedoms 
indicators and civil 
liberties. It ranks from 1 
(full democracy) to 7 (no 
democracy) . 
3 8 Gross capital formation consists of outlays on additions to the fixed assets of the economy plus net 
changes in the level of inventories (World Bank) . 
39 The values for missing data for Croatia is taken from UN dataset for 1 993 and from IMF (IFS) for 1 994 
40 Missing values for 1 990- 1 99 1  for Croatia, Czech Republic, Macedonia ( 1 99 1  only), Slovak Republic, 
and S lovenia are taken from EBRD report ( 1 999). However, in transition report inflation is  measured with 
the end of period consumer prices. So, there could be some data inconsistency. 
4 1 For missing values for the Czech Republic and Slovakia for the period of 1 990- 1 993, the value for 
Czechoslovakia were taken, assuming that the two countries did not vary very much. 
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Table 3a :  Descriptive Statistics (with first differenced variables) 
Panel I: Transition Countries 
( I )  (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES N mean sd min max 
t 622 I 2 .48 6 .936 I 25 
Growth 652 I . 863 8 .533  -52 .60 3 5 .3 8  
RT 652 0 .0874 0.283 0 I 
Ex growth 6 I 4  2 . 806 3 .224 - I 0.29 23 .26 
Govexp 643 I 7 . 1 7  4 .376 5 . 86 I  30 . 1 2  
Ire forms 650 3 .422 1 .047 1 4 .330 
Infl*hinfl 65 I I 50 .9 787. 1 0 I 5 ,607 
Fisbal D I 42 589 0 .330 4 .337 -40 .80 44 .20 
Inv D I  603 0.0680 4 .994 -32.05 23 .45 
Oilbal D I  575 O .O I 23 4 .7 I 6  -63 . 8 1  64 .02 
IC*t 622 - 1 .749 30 .53  -87. 1 1  70.72 
Panel II: All Countries 
( 1 )  (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES N mean sd min max 
Growth 950 I . 887 7 .244 -52.60 35 . 38  
RT 950 0 .0600 0.23 8 0 I 
Ex growth 9 1 2  2.48 1 2 .843 - 1 0.29 23 .26 
IC 950 0 .000526 2 .260 -3 .490 4 .020 
Lreforms 950 3 .709 0.963 I 4 .330 
Infl*hinfl 949 98 .93 63 8 .6  0 I 5 ,606 
Cris 950 0 .240 0 .427 0 1 
Inv D I  904 -0. 1 48 4 .583 -3 8 . 1 5  30. 8 1  
Fisbal D I  890 0 .0892 4.320 -40 .80 44 .20 
Oilbal D I  848 0 .0284 4 .045 -63 . 8 I  64 .02 
Govexp_D I 904 -0.0362 l .99 I - I 4 .07 2 1 .29 
t 950 1 3  7 .2 I 5  I 25 
IC *t 950 0 .00684 33 . 59  -87.25 1 00 .5  
lninc90t 950 I 23 .2 69.34 7 .954 268.4 
42 D l  stands for first difference. 
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Table 3b :  Descriptive Statistics (without first differenced variables) 
Panel /: Transition Countries 
( 1 )  (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES N mean sd min max 
t 622 1 2 .48 6 .936 1 25 
Growth 652 1 . 863 8 .533  -52.60 3 5 .3 8  
RT 652 0 .0874 0.283 0 1 
Exgrowth 6 1 4  2 .806 3 .224 - 1 0 .29 23 .26 
Gov exp 643 1 7 . 1 7  4 .376 5 . 86 1  30 . 1 2  
Inv 643 25 .56  8 .0 1 0  -0.69 1 59 .77 
Fisbal 627 -3 .324 5 .746 -54 .70 20 
Ire forms 650 3 .422 1 .047 1 4 .330 
lnfl 65 1 1 5 8 .5  785 .7  -8 . 530  1 5 ,607 
Oilbal 602 -0 . 1 1 6 9 . 1 3 1  -22.03 65 . 1 4  
hinfl 652 0 . 1 855 0 .3 89 0 1 
IC 652 -0 .00737 2 . 1 1 4 -3 .484 3 .075 
IC*t 622 - 1 .749 30 .53  -87 . 11 70.72 
Panel II: All Countries 
( 1 )  (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES N mean sd mm max 
Growth 950 1 . 887 7 .244 -52.60 3 5 .3 8  
RT 950 0 .0600 0.23 8 0 1 
Ex growth 9 1 2  2 .48 1 2 . 843 - 1 0 .29 23 .26 
Gov exp 943 1 8 .04 4.430 5 . 860 30 . 1 2  
Inv 943 24.73 6 .98 1 -0 .690 59 .77 
IC 950 0 .000526 2 .260 -3 .490 4.020 
Fisbal 928 -2 .772 5 .609 -54.70 20 
Ire forms 950 3 .709 0 .963 1 4 .330 
Oilbal 899 -0 . 1 1 4  7 .977 -22.03 65 . 1 4  
hinfl 950 0 . 1 284 0 .335  0 1 
Cris 950 0 .240 0 .427 0 1 
t 950 1 3  7 .2 1 5  1 25 
IC*t 950 0 .00684 33 . 59  -87.25 1 00 .5  
lninc90t 950 1 23 .2 69.34 7 .954 268.4 
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Table 4 :  Correlation Tables 
Panel I: Transition Countries 
G rowth IC*t t ' Exgrowth • Inv_D l • lreforms Fisbal_Dl · RT i Oilbal_D l • Govexp . Infl* hinfl . 
G rowth 1 
IC*t 
t 
Exgrowth 
Inv D l  
lreforms 
Fisbal D l  
RT 
Oilbal_D l 
Gov exp 
Infl* hinfl 
-0. 1 434 
0 .2856 -0 .0963 
0 .03 1 7  0.0008 
-0 .3 825 0 .5 1 22 
0 .03 3 1 -0 . 1 375 
0 . 1 006 -0 . 1 924 
0 .0205 0 .0009 
-0.3 8 1 5  -0 . 1 034 
0 .0282 -0.23 89 
Panel II: All countries (including non-transition countries) 
i 
1 · :· 
- -- '-- ----
·· · --
- - - - ·�·- - ·· ·�·+ · -· 1 I ---!---
-0.0724 I 
- � --;;-t 0 .0239 ! -0.0695 , 
----------� - -
- "- ·-· ---·� -
- --- - · 
· I  
· G rowth-T lninc90t I Inv_ni"T treforms Fisbal_Dl I RT Oilbal_Dl Govexp_D l I Infl*hinfl Cris I t 
' Growth 
lninc90t 
Exgrowth 
Inv_Dl 
lreforms 
Fisbal D l  
RT 
, Oilbal_D l 
Govexp_D l 
Infl*hinfl 
C ris 
t 
1 
0 .2 1 06 : 1 
-0 . 1 03 1 
0 .003 1 0 . 1 477 
-0. 1 847 
0 .6965 
0.9834 
-0 . 1 345 
0 . 1 5 77 i 
0.3666 
0 .0 1 24 1 
-0.00 1 2  -0.0042 1 
0 . 1 775 
-0.0769 
-0.0229 • -0. 1 529 
1 
0 .0088 
0 .0095 
-0.0 1 57 
1 
0 .7063 
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Table 5 :  Correlation Matrix of Variables Used for PCA 
Inc90 agr dist enerich prgr rep in fl 
Inc90 1 
agr -0 .5374 1 
dist -0 .6 1 78 0 .6504 1 
enerich 0.0883 0 .2474 0 .4007 1 
prgr -0 .4626 0 .656 0.456 0 . 1 489 1 
rep in fl -0 .307 0 .635 1 0 .4979 0 .3064 0 .3539  1 
blcmkt -0 .3785 0 .7336 0 .6 1 99 0 .3446 0 .5982 0 .8308 
cenplany -0 .4603 0 .5562 0 .7679 0 .4544 0 .492 1 0.6527 
Table 6 :  Results from Principal Component Analysis 
Component Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
Com pl 
Comp2 
Comp3 
Comp4 
Comp5 
Comp6 
Comp7 
Comp8 
N of comp 
LO 
N 
0 
0 
4.6363 1 3 .4434 0.5795 
1 . 1 929 1 0 .455006 0 . 1 49 1  
0 .737904 0 . 1 1 5 1 53 0 .0922 
0 .62275 1 0.249936 0.0778 
0 .3728 1 5  0 . 1 398 1 0 .0466 
0.233004 0 . 1 04956 0 .029 1 
0 . 1 28049 0.05 1 792 0 .0 1 6  
0 .076257 0 .0095 
8 N of obs 
Scree plot of eigenva lues after pea 
2 4 
Number 
6 
Figure 1 .  Scree Plot of Eigenvalues after PCA 
0 .5795 
0.7287 
0 .8209 
0 .8987 
0 .9453 
0 .9745 
0 .9905 
1 
26 
8 
blcmkt cenplany 
1 
0 .8082 
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Table 7 :  Component Loadings for the 
First Two Principal Components 
Variable Com pl Comp2 
Inc90 -0 .2857 0.5707 
agr 0.3929 -0 . 1 5 8 1  
dist 0.3875 -0 .0235 
enerich 0 . 1 966 0.7023 
prgr 0.3229 -0.2782 
rep in fl 0.3623 0 . 1 9  
blcmkt 0.4195 0 . 1 1 74 
cenplany 0.4046 0 . 1 68 
Note : numbers in bold have a value of more 
than 3.5 
Table 8: Countries'  Scores for Initial 
Conditions : from worst to best 
i Country i PCAl 
i Kyrgyz Republic ! 3 .07464 1 
1--- -�- ----- -··-·- -·-· - ···t--- - - - · - ' 
: Turkmenistan 2 .875482 • 
i Kazakhstan , 2 .832242 . , - - I 
· Uzbekistan ' 2.693023 • 
Tajikistan 2 . 1 82406 • 
:-----�---- -- �- -·--- - ·- ····• · - ----- ·-·- ···· · - ·  
: Azerbaijan 1 .6605 
>·--·---- -· - - --·-- · - - -------
: Moldova : 1 .534 1 93 · 
i Belarus 
l _M_C!����i_!' __ __ _ 
:_ Geo�-i� -- -- - - � - - -
Estonia 
Latvia 
, Albania 
_ _ _  !!ul�ari� _ . 
Poland 
Croatia 
Hungary 
- - "- � - ----·--- - - - - - - -
Slovenia 
�·C!�a-���J_>_ub!!�-­
����lt-��_ub_I!�- _ 
: -0 . 1 477 1 
-0 .60537 
- 1 .37533 
-2 .973 8 1  
-3 .2 1 784 . -
-3 .28636 
. -3 .4843 
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Table 9 :  Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy 
Variable kmo 
Inc90 0.6999 
agr 0.79 1 
dist 0.7859 
enerich 0.6248 
prgr 0.7736 
rep in fl 0.7808 
blcmkt 0 .7474 
cenppany 0.7599 
Overall 0.7576 
Note : if kmo>0 . 5 , a sample is  appropriate for factor analysis 
Table 1 0 :  Results of Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) 
. Variable 
_ _(;_�\'':��--- ­
Infl*hinfl 
· VIF lNIF 
: 1 . 7 1  ! 0 .5 84006 • 
. ; .. - - - +··· ··-··-··· ---- -·-·· j 
. 1 .46 . 0 .686 1 3 8  ! 
-�x��!"t� -- ----- - - -- -- - -� 
Fisbal Dl 
- - · - · - - · - ·- - ---· · 
RT 
Note : As long as VIF values are no greater than 1 0, there is no multicollinearity problem. 
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Table 1 1 :  Results of Tests of Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation 
Name of a Breusch-Pagan I Cook- White general test for Modified Wald test for Wooldridge test for 
Test Weisberg test for heteroskedasti city groupwise autocorrelation in 
heteroskedasticity heteroskedasticity panel data 
Ho Ho : Homoscedasticity Ho:  Homoscedasticity Ho : Homoscedasticity Ho : no first order 
autocorrelation 
Results chi2( 1 ) = 52 . 1 7  White's general test chi2 (26) = 875 .24 F(  1 ,  25) = 23 .995 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 statistic : 236 .072 1 Prob>chi2 = 0 .0000 Prob > F = 0 .0000 
Chi-sq (64) P-value = 
0 .0000 
Decision Reject Ho; There is a Reject Ho; There is a Reject Ho; There is a Reject Ho; There is a 
problem of problem of problem of problem of 
heteroskedasticity. heteroskedasticity. heteroskedasticity. autocorrelation. 
Estimation Pooled OLS Pooled OLS Fixed Effects (Panel) Panel 
Method 
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Table 1 2 :  The lmEact of Democrac� on Growth in Transition Countries 
( 1 )  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES GLS GLS Poland Czechia Belarus Russia 
IC*t 0 .0300* * *  0 .0332* * *  0 . 1 74* * *  0 .0564 -0 .585 * * *  -0 .3 8 1  
(0 . 0 1 07) (0 .0 1 1 2) (0.0363) (0.03 82) (0.0423) (0 .464) 
t 0 .0253 0 .0774* 
(0 .0425) (0 .0427) 
Ex growth 0.486* * *  0 .5 1 5 * * *  -0.405 * * *  0.425 * *  0.478* * *  -0 .0353  
(0.0489) (0.048 1 )  (0. 1 06) (0. 1 85) (0.084 1 )  (0.634) 
Inv D l  0 .343 * * *  0 .33 1 * * *  0 .795 * * *  0 .63 8* * *  0 .56 1 * * *  1 . 1 53 * * *  
(0.0285) (0.0277) (0.0937) (0. 1 67) (0.0798) (0 .3 52) 
Ire forms 4.444* * *  4 .736* * *  2 . 1 45 * * *  2 .902* * *  9 . 1 36* * *  3 .44 1 
(0.489) (0.4 1 6) (0 .735)  (0 .557) ( 1 .2 1 0) (5 .302) 
Fisbal D l  0 . 1 52* * *  0 . 1 35 * * *  0 .320* * *  0 .300* *  -0 .0258 0 . 1 50 
(0.03 1 2) (0.0308) (0 .0894) (0. 1 47) (0. 1 92) (0. 1 88) 
RT -4 .056* * *  -4 . 1 40* * *  - 1 .63 8 
(0.92 1 )  (0 .883)  (2.247) 
Oilbal D I  0 .00323 
(0.0305) 
Gov exp -0 .0879 
(0.0548) 
Infl*hinfl -0 .00089* * *  
(0.00023 8) 
Dem 0.685 * * *  0 .7 1 9* * *  -4 .037* * *  -5 .362* *  7 .900* * *  5 . 074* 
(0.236) (0 .237) ( 1 . 1 3 1 )  (2 .532) (0 .537) (3 .062) 
Constant - 1 5 . 38 * * *  - 1 9 . 1 6* * *  5 .269 - 1 .0 1 4  -54.68* * *  -28 .05 
(2.470) ( 1 .785) (3 .953) (5 .773) (2 .740) (22 .74) 
Observations 570 580 24 24 22 22 
Number of coun 26 26 1 I 1 I 
Heteroskedastic and autocorrelation of type AR ( 1 )  robust standard errors in parentheses 
* * *  p<0.0 1 ,  * *  p<0.05,  * p<O. l 
Notes: 
In column 1 ,  GLS estimation was conducted with full set of variables including democracy for Panel I .  
In column 2,  GLS estimation was conducted with core variables including democracy for Panel I .  
In  column 3 ,  GLS estimation was conducted for Poland with core baseline variables including democracy . 
In column 4, GLS estimation was conducted for the Check Republic (Czechia) . 
In column 5 ,  GLS estimation was conducted for the Belarus .  
In column 6, GLS estimation was conducted for the Russia. 
Time trend was excluded from the country-level analysis due to multicollinearity with IC *t. 
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Table 1 3 :  Estimation of Reforms 
( 1 )  (2) (3) 
VARIABLES OLS FE GLS 
IC*t 0 .00 1 95 0 .00426* *  0 .00 1 8 1  * 
(0.00256) (0.00 1 64) (0.00 1 04) 
t 0 .0279* * *  0 .0296* * *  0 .0379* * *  
(0.00424) (0.00325) (0.00346) 
I growth 0 .00545 0 .00760* * *  0 .003 1 1 * *  
(0.00367) (0.0027 1 )  (0.00 1 25) 
Growth 0 .02 1 7* * *  0 .0236* * *  0 .0 1 39* * *  
(0.004 1 0) (0.00290) (0.00 1 3 8) 
Dem -0.27 1 * * *  -0. 1 39* * *  -0. 1 78* * *  
(0.0642) (0.0428) (0 .0 1 67) 
Constant 4 . 1 90* * *  3 .7 1 5 * * *  3 .798* * *  
(0 .2 1 1 )  (0 . 1 5 1 ) (0.072 1 )  
Observations 607 607 607 
R-squared 0 .623 0 .690 
Number of coun 26 26 
Country FE effects yes 
Hausman Test p-value 0 .000 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* * *  p<0.0 1 ,  ** p<0.05,  * p<O . l 
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Figure I :  GDP Growth in Transition Time 
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Figure 3 :  Growth and Reforms 
0 
• Uzbekistan 
• M��nia 
• -Kazakhstan 
• oland 
/• Al ban ia  
\ 
• Czec� ��@!lilt 
• Hungary 
• S lovak Republi 
• Belarus 
0 
...... 
' 
Ll) 
...... 
' 
,4t Turkmenistan 
\ 
1 .5 2 
• Bu lgaria 
• L ithuan ia • Armenia 
• Georg ia  • Moldova 
2 . 5  
Average Reforms 
3 
• Latvia 
3 . 5  
Figure 3a: Growth and Reforms (first 5 years of transition) 
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Figure 3b: Growth and Reforms (first 1 0  years of transition) 
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Figure 3c:  Growth and Reforms ( last 5 years of transition) 
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Figure 3d: Growth and Reforms (al l transition years) 
86 
0 
N 
I 
0 
N 
0 
0 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Graphs by group(country) 
Russia 
1 0  20 
Time 
g rowth - - - - - fis J 
Figure 4: Growth and Fiscal Balance in Russia in Transition Time 
30 
87 
